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Messages - 12th BCT

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31
One important point about the land-based operations that USAFEE never had . . . and probably never even dreamed of: Air mobility. Precise movement of hundreds of troops by air. The AFP would be able to match Japanese forces man-for-man very very quickly no matter where they landed.

Throw in a little music for psychological effect

https://youtu.be/GKaYOW9zMoY

It's worth noting that the helicopters used in the movie Apocalypse Now were actually PAF Hueys.



Photo c/o PAF PIO



Question is: how large a force can the PAF move using Helis and paratroopers via C-130? How many are certified?

32
War on Drugs / Re: Duterte seeks AFP Help in Drug War
« on: December 28, 2016, 02:14:55 PM »
This opens the AFP to direct sanctions. The US State Department Blue Lantern program delivers sanctions and penalties at the Agency Level, which could mean cuts or halts to US military aid.

http://cnnphilippines.com/news/2016/12/08/Duterte-AFP-help-drug-war.html

Quote

FRONT PAGE  NEWS
Duterte seeks AFP help in drug war, says PNP 'fractured
By CNN Philippines Staff
Updated 00:40 AM PHT Thu, December 8, 2016
2.6K15

President Rodrigo Duterte (L) welcomes Lt. Gen. Eduardo Año as new Armed Forces chief.

Metro Manila (CNN Philippines) — Describing the police organization as "fractured," President Rodrigo Duterte repeats his call for the military to step in and help him out with his war against illegal drugs.

In his speech at Camp Aguinaldo on Wednesday during the change of command ceremony of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), Duterte said that "there were so many (police) men and officers involved in the drug industry."

He again admitted that he could not handle the problem on his own — as he would run out of time — and bullets — if he were to deal with this alone.

"And that is why, I repeat my orders and that's the reason why I declared a state of lawlessness so that I can call upon you, the Armed Forces, to help the civilian sector, to help the police. Di nila kaya 'to. At ang pulis mo, the policeman, the very ones who would be preventing the crimes, solving the crimes, arresting the criminals, are themselves into it."


How? And Why?

Can you cite the Program's governing rules and conditions that the Philippines would be violating, necessitating cuts and/or halting aid?

Note that declaring a state of lawlessness in certain areas and calling in the AFP in to assist in such an event is a constitutional provision. There's nothing wrong, per se, with what the President said.

Interesting. Will wait for the provisions governing aid packages under the Blue Lantern program you speak of.

33
Historical data shows that the reason behind ship to ship/fleet to fleet battles lasted as long as they did was due to time spent looking for the enemy fleet.

Facing ships with similar tech (IJN lacked radar), a better answer to your question is to know Japanese naval doctrine at that time.

I wish a PMA graduate with extensive research on WW2 fleet battle doctrine would chime in, but as far as I can tell:

The Japanese tried to develop destroyers that would engage and sink capital ships, with long range torpedoes as the main weapon. They were organized into destroyer flotillas usually commanded by a light cruiser (Japanese CLs were built like destroyer leaders).

Upon detection of the enemy fleet, their tactic was to weave towards their intended targets, fire a large salvo (in 1941 this meant firing half of their loads) from a range of 20,000m, then weave away to regroup, and attack again if necessary.

Usually, preferring night action.

But, the first order of the day was to detect the enemy fleet.

How would speed factor in a scenario where shells come crashing around and on your ship with an unheard of accuracy (then) and volume of fire (throw weight) from a source you couldn't locate? Where would you run? What direction? Logically away from the direction of the gunfire, but destroyers are thin skinned, with its speed, or rather, better acceleration as opposed to slower (acceleration) and better armored and armed capital ships.

But they would not be facing capital ships. They would be facing faster accelerating frigates and gunboats, with modern detection and targeting systems.

The IJN Ships had better top end speed, true. But acceleration compared to a gas turbine? Even to modern diesel sets?

They had boilers to power steam turbines, if I'm not mistaken.

Regardless, where and how would they run away from a target they can't see, much less detect? How much damage can it take from concentrated, modern 3in naval ammunition before they are rendered inutile?

Just like modern ships, top end speed is usually reserved for dashes during the course of battle. They don't steam at speed all the time.


34

A, how would that be? The OTOs higher rate of fire, superior accuracy, better fire control, even when ranged against the IJN Destroyers with more guns, most with manual loading, archaic gun directors?

If I was a PS 38 Captain, I'd target the bridge first and rake them with cannon fire, go for the torps, the magazine locations, while keeping the battle at distance.

Can our 76mm ammo actually penetrate IJN armor?

How many rounds can the WHEC's aluminum superstructure withstand?

A, I'm currently reviewing a PDF post battle damage report on a WW2 encounter, which, surprisingly, shows that IJN armour thickness and design that may allow modern OTO Melara 3in ammo to penetrate, damage, and if the correct round is used, cause enough damage to sink an IJN ship.

We need to find out what ammo the WHECs have as a load-out. HE-MOM I believe is standard.

Do we have SAPOMER rounds on the WHECs?

35
Going back to the much vaunted IJN Accuracy of naval gunnery and the Long Lance torpedoes mentioned by DDemented as a threat to the PN Patrol Force:

This is the Battle of Java Sea, where interestingly, shows the historically documented hit percentages of naval gunfire described in full.

Not the Battleship hit percentages, but 8inch, 6in and 5in main armament fire, where hundreds of shells were fired before the first recorded hit was made:


"The first exchange of fire lasted for one hour and three minutes. It was notable mainly for its lack of result. For 50 minutes, hundreds of 8" shells were hurled back and forth between the contending forces at ranges of 15000 to 25000 yards. At the same time, the Japanese launched 39 Long Lances at the Allied formation at ranges of 13000 to 25000 yards.

 All this took place without noticeable result until 1638, when a shell from a Japanese heavy cruiser scored a crippling hit on heavy cruiser Exeter's engine rooms. As the Allied cruiser slowed and sheered out of line, the Allied formation became disorganized.

In the confusion, a Dutch destroyer wandered into the path of a Long Lance and was erased. So much for the pre-war pundits of modern firepower -- a thousand 8" shells and almost 40 torpedoes had resulted in one damaged cruiser and one sunk destroyer."

The Dutch Destroyer was hit by a Long Lance by what appears as a stroke of luck for the IJN, and misfortune for the allies.

And this was in the Day phase of the battle. In the afternoon.

"The next stage of the battle lasted for 35 minutes. In this phase, Takagi's heavy cruisers continued to pound away at their opposite numbers, while his destroyers charged in to ranges as short as 6500 yards to launch torpedoes.

Closing the range did nothing to improve their accuracy; all of the more than 24 torpedoes launched missed their targets.

Japanese gunfire did better, as a countercharge by three Allied destroyers was turned back with one destroyer sunk. This action brought the opposing destroyer forces to within 3000 yards of each other, and at these ranges modern gunfire control systems proved to be as deadly as could be hoped."

To illustrate the advantages the PN would have at night:

"The third phase of the battle took place in darkness after a hiatus of more than an hour. During its 15 minute duration neither shells nor a Japanese torpedo attack launched at 21000 yards range failed to connect."

Then, they got lucky :

"Three and one-half hours later, the final act of the drama was played out. This time the stage belonged to the Japanese heavy cruisers, and this time they struck home.

After a fruitless 15 minute gunfire exchange, they mortally wounded two Dutch light cruisers with a 12 torpedo broadside launched from 8000 to 14000 yards out. Admiral Doorman went down with the Java. The remaining Allied ships broke off the action, only to be hunted down and exterminated in the succeeding days."


http://fireonthewaters.tripod.com/DOCTRINE%20ARTICLE.pdf

36
Or, since they were on a schedule and had to establish their objectives in the Philippines as part of their overall campaign, press on, regardless, based on previous intelligence of allied strengths prior to the time warp and spatial displacement?

Japanese planners had a propensity to vacillate when things go wrong. We saw this in the Battle of Midway, as well as the Battle of Leyte Gulf where TF Taffy put up more resistance than they expected.

Given that the PH invasion was essentially the opening phase of the expansion of the way . . . they would arguably be particularly jumpy.

Quote
Perhaps, we can choose the latter to stick to the timeline; though, in my opinion, they would've been forced to alter invasion plans after a disastrous December 11 landing, where the AFP would've killed them on the beaches.

A disastrous beach landing would definitely require a change in plans

So, moving forward with the What-if scenario:

1. Can we agree that if the IJN/IJA pushes through until the December 11 beach landing, the weight and accuracy of modern artillery would pin the IJA down?

2. Given PAF Air Dominance and the sheer volume of automatic small arms fire, coupled with armoured FSVs and AIFVs, helicopter gunships etc, the beaches would transform into a bloodbath?

3. With little to no fire control given to IJN ships, what sort of action would they be reduced to, seeing their troops being massacred?

4. The Soltams are 6inchers, and if emplaced correctly, can arguably reach out and touch the IJN Fleet if they come close enough. Though using high explosive rounds, these would damage exposed equipment on the BBs and cause worse on thinner armoured CLs and DDs.

5. Bigger GBUs can also be employed by the PAF. What was the missile the AS-211s are outfitted with?

Given they would have been given a bloody nose, and technological advances required to compensate for the disparity are decades away, what would have they done after?

I surmise the AFP would begin (with PNP help) a program to round up and incarcerate Japanese residents in the PI, as well as historically known Japanese sympathizers.

Given that all our equipment would be spatially displaced to the time in question, would it be possible, as we are free of any product copyright infringement, begin our own indigenous arms production and weapons systems design, to anticipate shortfalls in the more modern systems parts and maintenance?

What could've we arguably achieved?

37
More references on IJN Naval gunnery accuracy, using details from the engagement DDemented quoted.

The Battle of Savo island. Reading through the account, events give credence to the parameters set by Jurgens on my previous post, where:

1. Time to find range of target and 2. Percentage of hits after range was established.

Firing from a range of 6800 yards initially, the Japanese force did not score hits until the 5th Salvo after illuminating the US Cruisers with flares. Ranged against the WHECS and JCPVS, (and even the PN Old PF of the Humabon, Auks and Malvars, which can use their radar sets to set range into firing solutions) a night encounter with the Patrol Force would give the PN a decided a advantage in establishing range early and accurately, with modern targeting systems allowing the PN to put more throw weight on targets before the IJN adjusts accordingly.

At 80 rds per minute, imagine the chaos and confusion it would cause the IJN DD and CL Crews. And the damage caused to the thinner skinned CLs and DDs (as compared to the BBs, whose bigger guns have horrific historical weight on target percentages)

http://warfarehistorynetwork.com/daily/wwii/disaster-off-savo-island/

38
6 Dec 1941    27 Japanese troop transports departed from Taiwan, sailing for the Philippine Islands; 400 Japanese pilots stationed at Taiwan were briefed of the attacks to be commenced on the next day. Elsewhere, a Japanese invasion fleet boarded and scuttled a Norwegian freighter.

8 Dec 1941    Japanese Navy 11th Air Fleet land-based aircraft from Taiwan attacked US Army airfields on Luzon island, Philippine Islands as well as shipping in Manila Bay; at the latter location, American freighter Capillo was abandoned after receiving heavy damage.

Japanese Army aircraft joined in on the attack on this date also, striking Baguio and Tuguegarao at 0930 hours. North of Luzon, a Japanese force landed on Batan Island and established an air base.

8 Dec 1941    Saburo Sakai of Japanese Navy Tainan Air Group, flying an A6M Zero fighter, attacked Clark Field in the Philippine Islands; he shot down one P-40 Warhawk fighter.

9 Dec 1941    Japanese aircraft commenced the bombing of Manila, Luzon, Philippine Islands;
among the first targets in the capital city region was the US Army airbase Nichols Field.

10 Dec 1941    Cavite Navy Yard in the Philippine Islands was heavily damaged by Japanese aircraft; destroyers Peary and Pillsbury, submarines Seadragon and Sealion, and submarine tender Otus were damaged; ferry Santa Rita was sunk; minesweeper Bittern was destroyed by fire; about 60% of US Navy Asiatic Fleet's torpedoes were destroyed at Cavite.

A PBY Catalina aircraft, fleeing from the attack on Cavite Navy Yard, was attacked by three Zero fighters; gunner Chief Boatswain Payne shot down one of the Zero fighters, thus scoring the US Navy's first verifiable air-to-air kill of a Japanese aircraft in the Pacific War.

Elsewhere, Japanese aircraft attacked Manila Bay area, damaging American freighter Sagoland. Finally, Japanese troops of the 2nd Taiwan Regiment of the 48th Division landed on Camiguin Island and at Gonzaga, Vigan, and Aparri on Luzon Island.

11 Dec 1941    Japanese troops landed at Legaspi, Luzon, Philippine Island, with Nachi providing support for the landing at Legaspi, Philipine Islands.

This particular timeline highlights an important point that Dr Demented brought up earlier, c/o of an insightful comment on the FB extension.

The Japanese sought to establish air superiority before they actually sent their invasion force. Arguably wary of what US air power could do to their invasion fleet.

Would the invasion have even happened if we either completely shot down or badly bloodied their air squadrons on December the 8th?

The psychological effect of such heavy losses will give Japanese planners pause, not only because of the lack of air superiority, but also because it would mean that all the intelligence that their agents in the Philippines (disguised as toy merchants, et al.) had gathered over the years would all be called into question.

Or, since they were on a schedule and had to establish their objectives in the Philippines as part of their overall campaign, press on, regardless, based on previous intelligence of allied strengths prior to the time warp and spatial displacement?

Perhaps, we can choose the latter to stick to the timeline; though, in my opinion, they would've been forced to alter invasion plans after a disastrous December 11 landing, where the AFP would've killed them on the beaches.

39
Interesting figures 12th. References?

It appears naval gunnery for bigger caliber naval guns would've been the least of our problems.
The battle would've been more DD and CL VS PN PATROL FORCE. 5in to 6 in and 8in, where accuracies would've been better, but not by much. Versus 3 in rapid fire.

Naval gun directors of that era were nowhere near modern standards, where shell throw weight + better accuracy would give IJN Tin Cans problems.

Naval Gunnery concepts: (paraphrased)

1. The time required to "find the range" (i.e. throws before "clustering" about target)
2. The percentage of hits achieved after "the range is found."

A. Generally, the gunnery system which can find the range quickly, is more likely to keep the range and achieve many hits;
B.  Other factors come into play. Repeated hitting of the target after the range has been found also relies on the "tightness" of the shell clusters (i.e. they should land in a small ellipse) .
C. Ironically, a very tight cluster actually makes finding the range a bit more difficult. (1)

Would it be safe to conclude since modern radar finds the range quickly, modern firing software allows more accurate firing solutions, (vs mechanical firing solutions) the OTO Melara would be able to establish hits on IJN Ships, specially during night action, dictate the battle conditions, and make for dodge afterwards?

http://navweaps.com/index_inro/INRO_Hood_p4.htm
http://dionysus.biz/NavalGunnery.html

40
Military History / Re: Battle off Campones Island?
« on: December 26, 2016, 07:35:13 PM »
It says that the PN "captured" the Huang Feng. What was its final disposition?

41
Armed with the Historical Timeline above, the initial contact between the AFP and IJ Forces would be:

December 5 : detection and interception of Japanese reconnaissance aircraft, shooting them down.

December 6/7 pm and early am : engagement of the IJN Fleet via night action, where the PN Surface force, taking advantage of sensors, ship borne, airborne (via ELM-2032 lookdown) can exact attrition on Japanese transports. IJN Escorts can be kept at bay with battlescape management.

December 8 -11: knowledge of the IJAAF targets on these days, and the exact/approximate time and tracks, plus the advantage of Radar (land based? Civilian Radars I surmise are way better than the best radar of WWII) and FA-50 elm-2032, will allow the PAF to conduct effective interception operations.

Ground Based A2A, whether from the repurposed guns to elbit M113s, can be strategically located to provide an envelope of fire.

Details of how the above can be executed, I entrust to the more knowledgeable.

While this is ongoing, PA artillery and armour units, as well as regular troops, are strategically emplaced to contest the initial beach landing on December 11. PN MPACS, the Seakillers, etc,  lie in wait camouflaged in the shallows, to interdict Japanese landing craft after the beach bombardment ceases and the landing craft are sent in. OV-10s loiter beyond range, with PAF Helicopter Gunships standby to deliver A2G fire.


42
As seen above, it wasn't an overwhelming, lightning campaign. It took several weeks before reinforcement forces landed in Luzon, and the southern campaign as well.

The AFP, (kasama reserves at PNP di ba?) would be able to consolidate at the landing sites and arguably create a killing field for the Imperial Japanese troops at the first landing.

Even with the air attacks being what they were, the timeline shows interesting gaps the AFP could exploit.

43
Invasion of the Philippines Timeline: ( December 1941 for reference)

5 Dec 1941    Japanese aircraft conducted reconnaissance flights over the coasts of Luzon, Philippine Islands.

6 Dec 1941    27 Japanese troop transports departed from Taiwan, sailing for the Philippine Islands; 400 Japanese pilots stationed at Taiwan were briefed of the attacks to be commenced on the next day. Elsewhere, a Japanese invasion fleet boarded and scuttled a Norwegian freighter.

8 Dec 1941    Japanese Navy 11th Air Fleet land-based aircraft from Taiwan attacked US Army airfields on Luzon island, Philippine Islands as well as shipping in Manila Bay; at the latter location, American freighter Capillo was abandoned after receiving heavy damage.

Japanese Army aircraft joined in on the attack on this date also, striking Baguio and Tuguegarao at 0930 hours. North of Luzon, a Japanese force landed on Batan Island and established an air base.

8 Dec 1941    Saburo Sakai of Japanese Navy Tainan Air Group, flying an A6M Zero fighter, attacked Clark Field in the Philippine Islands; he shot down one P-40 Warhawk fighter.

9 Dec 1941    Japanese aircraft commenced the bombing of Manila, Luzon, Philippine Islands;
among the first targets in the capital city region was the US Army airbase Nichols Field.

10 Dec 1941    Cavite Navy Yard in the Philippine Islands was heavily damaged by Japanese aircraft; destroyers Peary and Pillsbury, submarines Seadragon and Sealion, and submarine tender Otus were damaged; ferry Santa Rita was sunk; minesweeper Bittern was destroyed by fire; about 60% of US Navy Asiatic Fleet's torpedoes were destroyed at Cavite.

A PBY Catalina aircraft, fleeing from the attack on Cavite Navy Yard, was attacked by three Zero fighters; gunner Chief Boatswain Payne shot down one of the Zero fighters, thus scoring the US Navy's first verifiable air-to-air kill of a Japanese aircraft in the Pacific War.

Elsewhere, Japanese aircraft attacked Manila Bay area, damaging American freighter Sagoland. Finally, Japanese troops of the 2nd Taiwan Regiment of the 48th Division landed on Camiguin Island and at Gonzaga, Vigan, and Aparri on Luzon Island.

11 Dec 1941    Japanese troops landed at Legaspi, Luzon, Philippine Island, with Nachi providing support for the landing at Legaspi, Philipine Islands.

12 Dec 1941    Japanese Navy 11th Air Fleet aircraft attacked the US Navy base at Olongapo in Luzon, Philippine Islands. At Legaspi, Japanese troops captured an airfield and moved north.

13 Dec 1941    Japanese Navy aircraft again struck the US Navy base at Olongapo at Subic Bay at Luzon, Philippine Islands. Various other bases and airfields in the Manila Bay area were attacked as well.

14 Dec 1941    In the Philippine Islands, three US B-17 bombers took off from the Del Monte airfield on Mindanao to attack the Japanese beachhead at Legaspi, Luzon.

15 Dec 1941    The US B-17 bombers at the Del Monte airfield on Mindanao, Philippine Islands were ordered to fly to Australia on the following day.

16 Dec 1941    US B-17 bombers at Del Monte airfield on Mindanao in the Philippine Islands departed for Australia.

17 Dec 1941    American passenger ship Corregidor departed Manila, Philippine Islands with about 1,200 civilians on board; a short distance later, while still in Manila Bay, she struck a mine previously laid by Japanese submarine I-124 and sank, killing many.

To the north, 24 transports with 7,000 Japanese troops aboard departed from the Ryukyu Islands, heading for Lamon Bay at eastern Luzon island.

18 Dec 1941    Japanese troops captured Naga, Luzon, Philippine Islands. To the north, the invasion convoy for the Lingayen Gulf assault departed from Taiwan and the Pescadores islands.

19 Dec 1941    Japanese aircraft attacked Olongapo, Luzon, Philippine Islands.

19 Dec 1941    Nachi provided support for the landings at Davao, Philippine Islands.

20 Dec 1941    Japanese troops landed near Davao, Mindanao, Philippine Islands, seizing the nearby airfield. At Cavite in southern Luzon, Lieutenant Colonel J. P. Adams received orders to evacuate his Marines from the area.

20 Dec 1941    Nachi provided support for the landings at Davao, Philippine Islands.

21 Dec 1941    US submarines based in Manila in the Philippine Islands withdrew to Surabaya, Java.

22 Dec 1941    45,000 troops of Japanese 48th Division and 90 tanks landed at Lingayen, Luzon, Philippine Islands at 0200 hours. From the capital city of Manila, Douglas MacArthur sent a radio message to his superior George Marshall in Washington DC, United States, noting that he had decided to announce Manila to be an open city to reserve the strength of his forces and to spare the lives of the civilians.

In southern Philippine Islands, 9 American B-17 bombers from Darwin, Australia attacked Japanese ships in Davao Gulf, Mindanao and then landed at Del Monte, Mindanao.

23 Dec 1941    In the Philippine Islands, as Japanese 48th Division marched south toward Manila, US Army General Douglas MacArthur began withdrawing to Bataan, declaring Manila an open city.

On the same day, USAAF B-17 bombers attacked Japanese ships at Lingayen Gulf and Davao in the Philippine Islands, while P-35 and P-40 fighters strafed landing ships in San Miguel Bay, Luzon, damaging destroyer Nagatsuki.

On Mindanao, the 9 US B-17 bombers originally from Australia refueled and took off to attack Japanese ships in Davao Gulf and Lingayen Gulf, damaging Japanese destroyer Kuroshio.

24 Dec 1941    7,000 troops of Japanese 16th Division landed at Lamon Bay, Luzon, Philippine Islands and marched toward Manila, which was only 50 miles away to the northwest.

 Near Ligayen Gulf on the western side of Luzon, the 26th Filipino Cavalry initially held up the Japanese invaders near Binalonian, but were forced to withdraw after suffering heavy losses; meanwhile, the Japanese landed an additional 10,000 men at Lingayen Gulf.

 In Manila, General Douglas MacArthur met with various leaders to organize the retreat into the Bataan peninsula per WPO-3; the 4th Marine Regiment was ordered to Mariveles at the peninsula's tip before going to Corregidor island.

24 Dec 1941    Nachi provided support for the landings at Jolo, Philippine Islands. She departed Philippine waters later in the day for Palau Islands.

25 Dec 1941    Japanese troops landed at Jolo, Philippine Islands and captured the island after wiping out the garrison of 300 Filipino militia and policemen.

Meanwhile, US Navy moved the headquarters of the Asiatic Fleet from Manila, Philippine Islands to Java. US Marines destroyed docks, fuel tanks, and ammunition dumps at Cavite Naval Shipyard.

26 Dec 1941    Despite that the Philippine capital of Manila was already declared an open city on 23 Dec 1941, Japanese bombing continued without interruption.

Shortly after, US Navy Admiral Hart of the Asiatic Fleet departed Manila by submarine USS Shark for Soerabaja, Java. In Manila Bay, USS Peary was damaged by Japanese aircraft. Philippine naval defense vessels moved to the island of Corregidor at the mouth of Manila Bay, and 411 US Marines originally based at Cavite moved to Corregidor Island.

27 Dec 1941    Japanese air units bombed Manila, Philippine Islands while 6 US PBY Catalina aircraft attacked Japanese warships at Jolo (4 would be shot down).

On land, Allied forces withdrew to the Santa-Ignacia-Gerona-Guimba-San Jose line 30 miles south of Lingayen Gulf, Luzon.

28 Dec 1941    On Luzon island, Philippine Islands, the US 4th Marine Regiment completed its move from the Bataan Peninsula to Corregidor Island except for the radar detachment. Meanwhile, also on Luzon, north of the capital of Manila, the Allied defenses fell back to the Tarlac-Cabanatuan line.

Over Manila, Japanese aircraft appeared again, sinking four freighters in Manila Bay. To the south, Japanese 16th Division captured Luisiana, with forward units reaching as far as Los Baños on the southern shore of Laguna de Bay.

29 Dec 1941    40 land-based bombers of the Japanese Navy 5th Air Group attacked Corregidor in the Philippine Islands for the first time. On Luzon island, Japanese Lingayen Force captured Cabanatuan, but American and Filipino forces held on to Tarlac to the west.

30 Dec 1941    Japanese Lingayen Force captured Tarlac on Luzon, Philippine Islands; American and Filipino forces fell back to the Bamban-Sibul Springs Line, the final defensive line north of Manila. South of Manila, the Japanese 16th Division reached the Laguna De Bay lake.

31 Dec 1941    Japanese Lingayen Force captured Sibul Springs, Luzon, Philippine Islands, breaching part of the final defensive line north of Manila. South of the city, Japanese tanks of Sonoda Force reached Baliuag.

44
Interesting figures 12th. References?


There's one link directly to the discussion were I found those figures. Going thru a list of other references to corroborate the data.

ALSO:

Since the Philippine and US Forces do not compute in the scenario, may I suggest emplacement of their modern AFP counterparts in their stead at the location timelines of the Imperial Japanese attack.

That will give us a clearer scenario of what probable outcomes and strategy may occur, as they are the foci of the Japanese attack on the Philippines.

45
A,

I've been trying to come up with OTO Melara 76 compact accuracy figures, but have come up empty so far. I placed a few inquiries with a few people who may have working knowledge of the super compact, will post IF and WHEN they have provided me with it.

With regard to Japanese Accuracy, I'll post a few data, I'll post the reference link later.


Quote
Nachi and Haguro fired 1619 shells, 845 for Nachi and 774 for Haguro during the battle of the Java sea at ranges of 28-24k and scored 7 hits, two on Exeter, two on Houston, two on DeRuyter, and one on Java.

The Allied commanders were impressed by the accuracy of the Japanese cruisers. The Japanese commanders weren't impressed with the allied cruiser's accuracy. They scored no hits.

Nachi and Maya fired 1611 shells, 707 for Nachi and 907 for Maya for 6 hits at 23-10k yards during the battle of the Komandorskis.

The accuracy was less than at the Java sea, mostly because the Salt Lake City was salvo chasing during most of the battle, and was covered by smoke screens for the last half of the battle.

Two were hits on Bailey during her torpedo run at between 10 and 13k yards.

http://alltheworldsbattlecruisers.yuku.com/topic/538#.WGC6g2WeqrV

WRT to the long lance torp:

Quote
The Japanese launched two huge torpedo salvoes, consisting of 92 torpedoes in all, but scored only one hit, on Kortenaer. She was struck by a Long Lance, broke in two and sank rapidly after the hit.


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