Author Topic: Air defense options for Taiwan  (Read 1171 times)


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Re: Air defense options for Taiwan
« Reply #1 on: September 18, 2019, 09:58:13 AM »
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Although, for the future, we see a potentially increased role for SAMs in defending Taiwan against air threats, they too have vulnerabilities, which China has made investments to exploit. Radar is the Achilles’ heel of SAMs. A SAM needs radar to identify, track, and attack air threats, but an emitting radar is like a bright neon sign and will quickly draw the attention of attack systems. China has numerous options to target located radars. Loitering antiradiation missile (ARM)
weapons, such as the Harpy, in the area could attack on detection. Fixed-wing aircraft in the area could also detect and engage SAMs with air-to-ground ARM weapons. Alternatively, numerous intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems could detect and locate the radar, cuing longer-range strikes from cruise missiles or even ballistic missiles, when the most sophisticated radars, and thus high-value targets, emit. If Taiwan employs its air defenses in what we
would characterize as a stalwart defense—that is, actively and persistently, defending a fixed area—those radars will not survive long once the adversary has decided to take them out. Without radar, the battery cannot operate. But we see that, unlike with fighter aircraft, Taiwan could adapt concepts to employ SAMs in ways that could make them
survivable enough to make important operational contributions to Taiwan’s defense.

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