Author Topic: "Distributed Lethality" for the Philippine Navy  (Read 1374 times)


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"Distributed Lethality" for the Philippine Navy
« on: June 21, 2019, 09:05:52 PM »
In US Navy terms, this is a move to arm every ship (tankers, supply ships, landing ships etc.) with weapons to contribute to the fight. Up to and including SSMs.
The effect of this would be more ships able to undertake a variety of missions and give commanders more lethal options.

Since the Philippines has so few ships to begin with, it should try to emulate this. 

Take the Tarlac class for example.  Despite being primarily a Landing ship, the PH typically sends it out on missions that in other navies would require a frigate.  Why?  Because it does not have enough hulls, much less any ships to send. 

It's time to recognize this and arm it accordingly.  SSMs, self defense SAMs, air search and surface search radars. The whole lot.  In PN practice, these ships are functionally not LSDs or SSVs, they are being used as dare-i-say Frigates.  It's time we recognize this and equip them accordingly, especially in the light of two new LSDs coming up the pipeline.

The PN cannot hope to match larger navies hull for hull.  The political will isn't there even if funding could be found.  But it can make better use of what it has by up-arming all the hulls that it currently has and making the newer hulls more effective. More shooters, to put it tritely, are better.


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Re: "Distributed Lethality" for the Philippine Navy
« Reply #1 on: June 23, 2019, 03:21:34 PM »
The USNI article on the concept

'Distributed Lethality'

For more power in more places, the Navy should increase the offensive might of the surface force and employ ships in dispersed formations known as ‘hunter-killer surface action groups.’Of Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jonathan Greenert’s three tenets, “Warfighting First” is at the top, and that is no accident. When Admiral Greenert assumed office he immediately set about honing the warfighting edge of the entire Navy. The surface warfare community has seized on this mandate, so much so that we really have only one priority—warfighting—and everything we do in organizing, training, programming, maintaining, equipping, and operating the surface force ultimately derives from this single priority. We have renewed our focus on combat readiness, material readiness, and personal readiness, but we focus here mainly on our initiatives in combat readiness.

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