Ok, I'm gonna give this one my best shot. Hope it's not too long-winded. And I'm sure there are things that I have forgotten to include:
“Skrewedupistan” evacuation scenario
The following information would be requested of the embassy staff in Skrewedupistan:
1. Figures for how many people to be repatriated in each port city and in the interior of the nation.
2. Number of people in the border cities.
3. Constant up to date status of security situation in both port cities, the interior city, and the border cities.
4. Status of port facilities in both port cities.
5. Presence of airports or landing facilities in the port cities.
6. Status of airport in the interior city.
7. Status of roads all roads in the country.
General plan
1. Those individuals in the border cities would be instructed to cross the border in to neighboring countries.
2. Interim evacuation assets will be chartered/requisitioned as necessary for immediate term evacuation.
3. Air and naval assets of the AFP would be deployed in order facilitate the departure of the bulk of evacuees.
Evacuation over the border
1. Evacuees would be instructed by embassy and consular staff to head immediately for the nearest, safest border crossing.
a. Evacuees would be advised to carry only minimal essential belongings.
b. Embassy and consular staff on both sides of the border will facilitate border crossings of evacuees.
c. Embassy and consular staff should be alert to the possibility that one or both sides of the civil war may attempt to close the border for
whatever reason.
d. Embassy and consular staff should be alert to the possibility that the neutral border country may attempt to close its side of the border in
order to restrict the flow of refugees.
2. Embassy and consular staff on the other side of the border will facilitate the return of evacuees to the Philippines via chartered civilian aircraft.
3. Evacuation to the east to Oman would facilitate coordination with the air and sea evacuations, since Muscat Airport would be used as the staging area for evacuees to board chartered civilian flights returning to the Philippines.
4. Evacuation to the west to Yemen would present its own challenges, since Yemen itself is inherently unstable. That country’s instability may hamper evacuation and relief efforts, and contingencies should be made to facilitate alternate evacuation plans.
Evacuation via air and sea assets of the AFP
Logistics
Because the employment of air and sea assets of the AFP for use in an evacuation situation would entail travel of a distance of over 5000 miles, it would become necessary for the Department of Foreign Affairs to set up logistical arrangements in order to allow for resupply and provisioning of those air and sea assets in order for them to operate far from home. One or more of the following locations could be considered in order to provide that logistical support:
Naval
1. Changi Naval Base, Singapore
2. INS Utkorsh, Andaman Islands, India
3. INS Dweeprakshak, Lakshadweep Islands, India
4. US Naval Support Activity, Bahrain
5. King Abdulaziz Naval Base, Saudi Arabia
6. Said Ibn Sultan Naval Base, Oman
Air
1. King Abdulaziz Air Base, Saudi Arabia
2. Car Nicobar or Port Blair Air Force Base, Andaman Islands, India
3. Changi Air Base, Singapore
4. Isa Air Base, Bahrain
5. RAFO Muscat (Muscat Airport), Oman
Air Evacuation Component:
Air Assets to be used
4 Lockheed C-130 Hercules transports (evacuation capacity around 90)
3 EADS CASA C-295s (capacity around 70)
These aircraft were chosen because of their larger size and ranges in excess of 2000 miles. Because Skrewedupistan is 5000 miles from the Philippines, the transport aircraft would need to make multiple stopovers for refueling at bases in Singapore and/or the Andaman Islands before proceeding to a staging area closer to Skrewedupistan. Ideal forward staging bases would be in Oman.
The idea is to have the PAF transports fly from staging bases to available and safe airports in Skrewedupistan, pick up evacuees, and return to the staging bases. From there, evacuees would be transferred to chartered, civilian airliners which would take them the rest of the way to the Philippines.
The initial flights into Skrewedupistan should carry PA and/or PMC personnel in order to act as security and to create a safe zone to facilitate the evacuation.
The problem with the air evacuation component is that with a limited number of transports, the evacuation process is going to be nightmarishly slow. This is complicated by the fact that all other nations have already completed their evacuations and have pulled out. And as such, other nations would be hesitant to go back in and risk their own personnel to assist a nation that has been laggard in its response to the crisis.
One contingency would be to consider flying a civilian airliner into the airport in order to have an air asset with greater capacity to get more people out. However, given the unstable nature of the situation, the likelihood of getting such conditions to conduct a civilian airliner in and out of the combat zone would be very low.
Other contingencies would involve finding a way to convoy evacuees from the interior city to either the nearest border crossing or the nearest port. However, given the unstable situation, the ability to obtain adequate transport and the ability to find safe, passable roads would be difficult at best.
Sea Evacuation Component
This would arguably be the most logistically challenging portion, since the sea distance from Manila to Skrewedupistan is in excess of 5000 nautical miles. This would require multiple stops in various locations along the route such as Singapore, the Andaman Islands, and perhaps naval bases in India. The ideal location for a forward naval staging area would be in Oman, which is adjacent to the area concerned. The Department of Foreign Affairs would be responsible for making the necessary arrangements to request access from the pertinent governments.
It should also be noted that such a journey of 5000 nautical miles would entail a trip of at least 3 weeks, assuming that any vessels going there would be traveling at a cruising speed of 15 knots. As a result, provision should be made to implement a stop gap measure for the immediate term. The most likely means would be to charter a ferry service between Skrewedupistan and Oman. Again, this would be dependent on the ferry operator willing to risk their vessel in an active war zone.
Naval Assets:
Two task forces shall be constituted in order to embark an evacuation fleet.
Task Force 1
This is the main evacuation fleet. This task force should be divided into two separate task groups, one to be deployed to each of the two port cities.
Task Group 1.1
1 Gregorio del Pilar class frigate (with embarked AW109 helicopter)
1 Tarlac class landing platform dock (with 2 AW109 helicopters)
1 auxiliary transport: Ang Pangulo
Task Group 1.2
1 Gregorio del Pilar class frigate (with embarked AW109 helicopter)
1 Tarlac class landing platform dock (with 2 AW 109 helicopters)
Notes:
1. The Tarlacs would act as the primary evacuation vehicle, with a capacity of around 500 evacuees. Philippine Marines should be embarked to act as security details in order to secure the port areas to allow for the evacuations to take place in an orderly manner. Consideration should be given for embarking at least 1 MPAC per Tarlac in order to provide waterborne security for the Tarlacs. However, such embarkation of MPACs should not significantly reduce the number or operation of the LCUs that are normally embarked. While it may be possible for the Tarlacs to dock at their respective port, security may dictate that evacuees may have to be ferried to the SSVs through use of LCUs.
2. Consideration should be given to augmenting the two task groups with RO-RO type vessels that are either chartered or requisitioned. Obtaining the use of ROROs may be hampered by the fact that those vessels would be brought into a war zone. And as such, ship owners may demand compensation in case the ship were ever damaged or lost. However, such vessels would have much greater capacity to handle evacuees, and would significantly speed up the evacuation process.
3. The Gregorio del Pilar class frigates would act as escorts for the transport vessels, providing some defensive security, particularly against smaller vessels. However, given that the scenario outlined mentions that both sides are using anti-ship missiles, the del Pilars would be limited in defending from such attacks. What little defense would involve the release of chaff either from the ships themselves, or from the AW109 helicopters in a role similar to what the British did using their Sea King helicopters during the Falklands War. Additionally, the del Pilars can provide fleet and port security via their embarked helicopters. They can also carry a limited number of evacuees.
4. The Ang Pangulo is included for its ability to carry some evacuees, and because its speed and range do allow the ship to keep up with the rest of the fleet (with the Tarlacs being the slowest of the task force).
5. The objective of the task force is not to ferry evacuees all the way back to the Philippines. Rather, they are tasked with ferrying the evacuees to a staging area in nearby Oman, where they would disembark and be transferred to civilian airliners for return to the Philippines.
6. As much as possible, the Philippine task force should cooperate with the international convoys operating in the area.
7. Marines aboard the two Tarlac class ships, as stated earlier, will act as security at the ports to facilitate evacuation. Additionally, they could be tasked to locate and secure potential helicopter landing sites as needed, which may be used to help facilitate evacuation.
Task Force 2
1 Gregorio del Pilar class frigate
2 Bacolod City class logistics support vessels
This task force would be a reserve task force, to be deployed only if absolutely necessary. While the Bacolod City class does have decent transport capacity and range, their slow speed means that the task force would arrive one month after the evacuation began.
None of the other floating assets available to the Philippine government would have adequate size, range, and/or speed to take part in an evacuation operation. However, those assets remaining should be deployed accordingly, since the Philippine Navy’s best assets will have been deployed thousands of miles away for an extended period of time.
The Political and Diplomatic Component
1. Given the short timetable, assume that no further assets can be acquired on short notice, and that we would be working with what we have. However, it is imperative that the Congress approves emergency funding in order to fund the evacuation operation, as well as any chartering of private air and sea services as required in order to facilitate the evacuation.
2. Embassy and consular officials should maintain an open line of communications with both factions in the civil war, emphasizing that the Philippines is a neutral party to the dispute. In so doing, officials should seek to maintain safe areas for civilians, and ensure to the best of their ability that Philippine forces that are brought in to facilitate the evacuation are kept out of the conflict. However, it should be made clear to both sides that Philippine forces will act to protect themselves and the Philippine nationals so long as they are in the country. The most important thing is to secure access to the port facilities in both coastal cities, and the airport in the interior city.
3. Philippine forces should cooperate to whatever extent it can with the international convoys that are operating in the area. Consideration may be given to instituting and cooperating with convoys involving nations that are considered to be non-aligned in the conflict.
4. Cooperation with the United Nations with regard to efforts to mediate a cease fire between the opposing sides. Any halt in the fighting would buy precious time in order to facilitate an evacuation.
5. As mentioned before, cooperation with other friendly nations with regard to facilitating logistics for AFP units operating in the region.
6. If at any point, Philippine forces and civilians are threatened, consideration should be given for requesting through diplomatic channels the imposition of a no-fly zone.
Contingencies
Commanders in the field will need to plan accordingly for the following “what-ifs”
1. If the Omani and/or Yemeni borders were to be closed, either by their respective countries and/or factions in the civil war.
2. If the airport and/or its runway were to be incapacitated in any way, thereby rendering flight operations impossible, with evacuees and Philippine personnel still present in the interior city.
3. If one or both port facilities in the coastal cities were to be rendered in operative in any way, such that further evacuations of civilians and Philippine personnel could not be continued.
4. If Philippine aircraft or ships were to be fired upon by any of the belligerents in the civil war.
