Surface Forces Are RefocusedBy Vice Admiral Thomas S. Rowden, U.S. Navy
Posted January 03, 2018
http://www.public.navy.mil/surfor/Pages/Surface-Forces-Are-Refocused.aspx#.W4uBrOhKjD4< Edited >
Fitzgerald and John S. McCain
While there is a good deal of focus being placed on the degree to which mission qualifications had been waived in the Japan-based Forward Deployed Naval Force (FDNF), both the Fitzgerald and John S. McCain had demonstrated the minimum requirements for getting under way and conducting routine operations.
In each collision, known and understood direction—whether from the commanding officer or technical authorities—was ignored or disregarded by watchstanders. In each case, there were notable deviations from standard operating procedures. Do such deviations occur as the result of systemic failures in the production of surface ship readiness at a force level? If so, how? What is the transmission path of the error that begins as a mismatch of supply and demand resources at the fleet level and ends up with a qualified officer of the deck not making required reports to the commanding officer?
This question is difficult, if not impossible, to answer, because the “dots” do not necessarily connect. Regardless of whether a systemic failure is demonstrated across the fleet, we must be critical of all the policies, procedures, and schools we use to man, train, and equip the fleet. This is a complex process and requires synchronization across the community and Navy to ensure both unit-level proficiency and force-level support are improved to achieve the readiness and warfighting proficiency our nation demands and our sailors deserve.
Comprehensive Review
On 2 November 2017, Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Admiral John Richardson released the findings of a panel led by Admiral Philip Davidson, Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command, that reviewed the state of readiness of the surface force and how that readiness interacted with the specific circumstances involved in the incidents of 2017. In his findings, Admiral Davidson identified gaps in doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities. For example:
n doctrine, the review found weaknesses in the way operational tasking is prioritized and issued to Japan-based ships; in organization, variances were identified in headquarter staffs and the manner by which they execute command and control and manage the readiness of assigned forces; in training, gaps were noted in the way seamanship and navigation skills are provided and assessed for individuals and teams on surface ships; for material, inconsistencies and gaps were found in the configuration control and oversight of bridge navigation systems; in leadership and education, deficiencies were noted in the leader’s ability to identify, mitigate, and accept risks, and then learn rapidly from near-miss events and other hazards; in personnel, gaps were identified in the qualification and proficiency of the surface force in seamanship and navigation; and in facilities, gaps were identified in the shiphandling trainers and associated shore-based infrastructure in place to support training for seamanship and safe navigation at sea. 3
The panel’s report categorizes these gaps in five key areas or tenets:
(1) Fundamentals. Basic skills such as seamanship and navigation, rigor in individual qualification processes, proficiency, and adherence to existing standards.
(2) Teamwork. The extent to which the surface force deliberately builds and sustains teams, and whether they are tested with realistic and challenging scenarios.
(3) Operational Safety. The process and tools by which ships are made ready for tasking, ships are employed, and technology is used to safely operate at sea.
(4) Assessment. The extent to which ships and headquarters plan, critically self-assess, generate actionable lessons learned, and share knowledge across the force.
(5) Culture. The sum of the values, goals, attitudes, customs, and beliefs of the surface force that defines its identity. 4
The report speaks to these five tenets, noting that its key findings and recommendations “are intended to instill the needed capabilities and proficiencies to make the surface force safer and more effective.” 5 The conclusions contained in the report are an important start to revitalizing the professionalism of the surface force and reestablishing warfighting excellence on a base of sound and fundamental competence.
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