Lessons from South Korea
Thanks to the selection of the Korean Aerospace Industry FA-50 Golden Eagle for the Philippine Air Force's Lead-In Fighter Trainer / Surface Attack Aircraft requirement, the
Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA) has gained prominence in the Philippine defense social media circles for its involvement in negotiations for the purchase of the aircraft. DAPA defense materiel acquired from South Korea and is tasked with the harnessing of manufacturing capacity of South Korean industry in that country's defense.
It's Website describes its function as follows. The DAPA is tasked implementation of the following national policies:
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- Reinforcement of R&D in national defense
- Reinforcement of global competitiveness of the acquisition program
- Expansion of export support for the defense industry
- Prioritization of domestic R&D
- Strengthening cooperation of nation-wide science and technology
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Like the US DARPA, this entity leverages already existing capabilities, but adds a marketing function to the equation because of its involvement in the export of South Korean defense technology.
Lessons from India
The Indian
Department of Defense Production (DDP) takes a direct hand in the production of military equipment for the Indian military, from the HAL Tejas Light Combat Aircraft to the Arjun Main Battle Tank. The following
organizations fall under this department's control:
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- Ordnance Factory Board (OFB)
- Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL)
- Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL)
- Garden Reach Shipbuilders & Engineers Limited (GRSE)
- Goa Shipyard Limited (GSL)
- Hindustan Shipyard Limited (HSL)
- Mazagon Dock Limited (MDL)
- BEML Limited (BEML)
- Bharat Dynamics Limited (BDL)
- Mishra Dhatu Nigam Limited (MIDHANI)
- Directorate General of Quality Assurance (DGQA)
- Directorate General of Aeronautical Quality Assurance (DGAQA)
- Directorate of Standardisation (DOS)
- Directorate of Planning & Coordination (Dte. of P&C)
- Defence Exhibition Organisation (DEO)
- National Institute for Research & Development in Defence Shipbuilding (NIRDESH)
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DDP efforts put India in a position to absorb foreign technologies as part of co-production ventures. Hindustan Aircraft Limited, for example, is now gearing up for local production of France's most advanced combat aircraft to-date:
Rafale Multi-Role Fighters. It is worth noting that the DDP was created at a time when the defense industry was the reserved for the public sector. In 2001, India opened the industry up to private sector involvement with up to 100% domestic participation and a maximum of 26% foreign
direct investment.
Lessons from Pakistan
Like it's similarly-named Indian counterpart, the Pakistani Ministry of Defense Production (MODP) participates in the manufacture of defense materiel for its armed forces. Among other achievements, it is the driving force behind local production of the Chinese JF-17 Light Combat Aircraft. Its
Website describes its role as follows:
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- Laying down policies or guidelines on all matters relating to defence production
- Procurement of firearms, weapons, ammunition, equipment, stores and explosives for the defence forces
- Declaration of industries necessary for the purpose of defence or for the prosecution of war
- Research and development of defence equipment and stores
- Co-ordination of defence science research with civil scientific research organizations
- Indigenous production and manufacture of defence equipment and stores
- Negotiations of agreements or MOUs for foreign assistance or collaboration and loans for purchase of military stores and technical know-how or transfer of technology
- Export of defence products
- Marketing and promotion of activities relating to export of defence products
- Coordinate production activities of all defence production organizations or establishments
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Like the Indian model, the Pakistani government is deeply involved in the manufacture of its own defense articles. Like the South Korean DAPA, the MODP also takes steps to promote the export of Pakistani technology.
Lessons from Singapore
The Defense Science and Technology Agency (DSTA) is the latest Singaporean Ministry of Defense (MINDEF) organization dealing with defense-related R&D and procurement. Its official
Website describes its role as follows:
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- Acquiring platform and weapon systems for the SAF
- Advising MINDEF on all defence science and technology matters
- Designing, developing and maintaining defence systems and infrastructure
- Providing engineering and related services in defence areas
- Promoting and facilitating the development of defence science and technology in Singapore
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It was established in 2000 and absorbed the functions of the what was then known as the Defense Technology Group (DTG). Tim Huxley, in his book Defending the Lion City, credited DTG with facilitating the creation of the Singaporean defense industry by acting as intermediaries between foreign defense companies who were willing to enter into Industrial Cooperation Programs (ICP) with Singapore and state-owned corporations to include the following:
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- [em][strong]Chartered Industries of Singapore (CIS)[/strong][/em] - initially established in 1967 to produce small arms ammunition, it eventually branched out into license production of M-16 rifles. By the 70s this company was manufacturing larger weapons like machine guns, mortars, and grenade launchers
- [em][strong]Singapore Shipbuilding and Engineering[/strong][/em] - established in 1968 to maintaining and building naval vessels, entered into a technology transfer arrangement with the German firm Lurssen which eventually resulted in the construction of motor gun boats for the Royal Singaporean Navy
- [em][strong]Singapore Electronic and Engineering Ltd[/strong][/em] - established in 1969 to provide electronic engineering services for the Singaporean Air Force
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These and other companies were brought under a holding company owned by the Singaporean Ministry of Finance but directed by MINDEF. By 1989 this holding company was restructured to accommodate diversification of its activities beyond purely military ventures such as electronics and engineering and renamed Singapore Technologies (ST) Holdings.
The ICP arrangements brokered by DTG, now DSTA, initially allowed Singaporean companies to accomplish self-reliance activities such as in-country manufacturing components for the Singaporean Air Force's CH-47 Chinook helicopters and F-16 fighters. In 1999 it allowed Singapore to become a major participant in the US-UK Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program.
Implications for Philippine SRDP
Close scrutiny of the histories of the five self-reliance samples presented above offer a number of take-aways:
Stable self-reliance policies. The political decision to establish and maintain a domestic defense industry must be measured in decades, not mere years, to give these policies a chance to yield results. The Indian Tejas LCA program, for example, started in
1983 but even as late as 27 years later (as per Air Forces Monthly, May 2010) HAL was only producing its third Limited Series Production aircraft. Although the Tejas program is sometimes touted as an example of why domestic production is more a political decision than a practical one, it remains an example of the length of the gestation period for such endeavors -- which go beyond time-in-grade timetables of individual officers, even beyond normal Presidential terms.
In the Philippines, a fair number of SRDP-related endeavors are conducted by service-level research organizations, often resulting from serendipitous pairings of SRDP-minded officers with industrialists and/or inventors willing to take a chance at dealing with the Philippine government. While efforts these do have their place in the grand scheme of things, the more complicated projects that take this route that have historically churned out one-off products. Often times, when time-in-grade issues force AFP personnel handling projects to leave their positions, development stops. Even when a project reaches completion, the departure of its original proponents often cause a change in the institutional stance towards the endeavor, resulting in either outright cancellation of the project or worse: indefinite postponement.
An SRDP-czar-like body such as Philippine DARPA, that is independent of the various services but is supported by the Department of National Defense, could presumably provide some stability to the these sorts of efforts.
Each to his own competence. The military shouldn't run these programs alone. Other sectors of the government have a role to play and their respective skill-sets must be brought to bear (e.g., Finance, Trade & Industry, etc.). Singapore, for example, drew about the expertise of the Ministry of Finance to setup financial a holding entity to manage and finance the various self-reliance companies and architect their expansion into alternative profit centers. Ministry of Defense involvement was primarily at the technical and requirements definition level.
Interfacing with private sector entities such as the aforementioned Defense Industry Association, or similar organizations, could draw in additional talent that would otherwise not be available in government service.
Profit. Export of whatever defense articles are produced is a key goal. This not only extends the longevity of the production line, it also facilitates achievement of economies of scale. As mentioned earlier, the South Korean DAPA served as the primary point of contact for the South Korean defense industry.
Mature procurement system. For the non-American samples, their self-reliance programs are closely tied to their procurement procedures. Implementation of an SRDP roadmap cannot outstrip the efficiency of the DND-AFP's overall acquisition system. Therefore advancement of the DND's procurement service is essential to progress in SRDP.
In the Singaporean system, both foreign and domestic defense companies take part in open bidding for MinDef contracts. However procurement rules grant participants in Industrial Cooperation Programs with Singaporean companies additional "weight" in the final selection. There are no such protections in the Philippine setting, where the original SRDP Presidential Decree was actually amended in December 2003 through GPPB Resolution 06-2003 which deprived the government of the option to pursue SRDP acquisitions without subjecting potential participants to public bidding. This reflects an institutional attitude towards defense that generally hostile to SRDP.
Arguably, DARPA, DAPA, and DSTA represent the ideal free-market oriented relationship between the defense department and private industry. With indigenous defense-oriented companies actively taking part in developing tailor-made weapon systems in response to government requests and receiving production contracts in open competition with both domestic and foreign companies. At this point in history, the Philippines is nowhere near having this state of affairs. Despite SRDP being a 14-year-old program, the Philippines remains closer to the starting points for DDP, MODP, and DSTA than the present-day state of either DAPA or DARPA.
In crafting its equivalent to DARPA / DAPA / DDP / MODP / DSTA, the Philippines with two choices:
1. Select an existing government entity and expand its role
2. Create a completely new entity with resources drawn from existing entities
The United States faced a similar question when it evaluated its efforts to put a man on the Moon by the 70s. One of the candidates foundations for the expanded effort was the National Advisory Committee for Astronautics (NACA) which had been organized in [a href="
http://history.nasa.gov/SP-4406/chap1.html"]1915[/a] and had been guiding American aerospace development since then. However, on the strength of the General Accounting Office which had judged NACA as having become too lethargic to keep pace with technological developments at the time, the US Congress enacted legislation that created an entirely and NASA was born. What route the Philippines ultimately takes will depend on similar evaluations of existing Philippines departments and/or government owned and controlled corporations.
The following organizations, theoretically at least, possess the key elements necessary for the creation of a Philippine DARPA:
Government Arsenal - as already mentioned earlier, this institution has been chosen as the lynchpin for renewed SRDP efforts. Its plant site in Limay, Bataan has been designated as a Defense Industrial Estate and the GA recently issued a bid invitation for consultancy services for the creation of a
Master Development Plan for its continued development. For this reason, this is the logical base upon which a Philippine DARPA and SRDP-roadmap-custodian can be based. However, to approach the capabilities of the above-mentioned self-reliance organizations it will require significant expansion beyond its current areas of expertise which are primarily in manufacturing and research & development and currently focused ordnance and small arms technology.
Defense Industry Association - this is an group of Philippine companies that are have chosen to involve themselves in the domestic security market place. Its members include companies that were part of the original SRDP effort in the 70s and have varying levels of expertise in their respective fields. Arguably DIA members would be involved primarily in production and certain aspects of R&D, leaving responsibility for SRDP policy direction to the DND itself. How this relatively new entity develops remains to be seen
Philippine Aerospace Development Corp - this
aerospace SRDP pioneer has assembled a total of 67 Britten Normal Islands and 44 BO-105 helicopters for the Philippine market and has established overhaul and maintenance facilities for various relatively low-technology aircraft and engine components. The company is currently in such a dismal state that the Commission on Audit recommended considering closure of the company in
2012. Despite being certified for BN Islander overhaul, that still didn't make it the preferred vendor for the Philippine Navy's Britten Normal Islander refurbishment programs which when to
Hawker Pacific Ltd instead.
Philippine Investment & Trading Corporation - the
PITC brings the necessary expertise to sell Philippine products to the world and would be a key player in the export of whatever defense articles the Philippine defense industry produces. This organization brings complex financial transaction experience to the table and was the AFP's agent for past counter-trade deals that eventually acquired the SIAI-Marchetti S211 aircraft, and various communications equipment. What the organization lacks however, as reported for the
Commission on Audit, is the technical expertise to adequately comprehend military requirements.
While the Government Arsenal's central role in SRDP, at least in the near term to mid-term, is both logical and inevitable, where SRDP goes in the long term will depend on a NACA-NASA-like evaluation of the GA's performance, as well as those of the other entities listed above. Only time will tell if the SRDP roadmap and responsibility for a Philippine DARPA will go to an existing SRDP actors or an entirely new entity. All that is certain is that if the goals of SRDP are ever to be achieved the status quo cannot continue.