PN should look back at the basics

[Juramentado]

USCG is green water? CG tends to be in deep waters and harder WX than most Navy TFs. Not to mention there are overseas and regional deployments of CG for Force Protection, Narcotics Interdiction, International SOLAS. If you look at the top-tier cutter designs, those are absolutely deep blue water capable, and they go there, a lot.

[horge]

If you look at the top-tier cutter designs, those are absolutely deep blue water capable, and they go there, a lot.

You're citing individual vessel designs employed by a service
I was talking about the asset-profile of the service.

Until USCG develops and maintains a robust, in-house blue-water UNREP capability,
it will be remain a green-water consideration: one that is designed primarily for opns
in its nation's littorals, but retaining an ability operate in open ocean contexts.

[mayk]

Until USCG develops and maintains a robust, in-house blue-water UNREP capability,
it will be considered a green-water consideration: one that is designed primarily for
opns in its nation's littorals, but retaining an ability operate in open ocean contexts.

Why would the USCG need one when they can interoperate with the USNs fleet auxiliaries?

[horge]

Why would the USCG need one when they can interoperate with the USNs fleet auxiliaries?

Well, that's my point about asset profiles and service missions:
Every service has a profile of assets to employ. USCG hasn't the necessary profile of assets
to operate independently as a blue-water fleet, largely due to its original mission, as the
oldest armed service of the US: coastal patrol, instead of multi-oceanic force projection.

Even if USN did NOT have logistical muscle for USCG to lean on, USCG's mission might not
tend to encourage developing such muscle for the USCG.

It is, I believe, BECAUSE of its understandable lack of CONREP/UNREP muscle that USCG
vessels have more robust endurance (see CODAG), whereas USN frontliners, with the
luxury of frequent replenishment, can afford to be fast-burn COGAG platforms.

CONREP/UNREP is only the most visible diff, actually, and all  ^my green vs. blue blather
was just to flesh out the point that in the Philippines, unlike the US, it is very easy to get
lost, planning for individual asset specifications (for an OPV, or for an SSV, or whatever),
versus planning an asset-profile made up of multiple assets.

PN and PCG largely share an AO, and since operating environment (together with financial
wherewithal and mission need) will dictate the profile of an armed service's assets, there
will be similarities in assets despite a dissimilarity in missions:

It goes back to original, chief missions of PH armed services, whether they were patterned
after foreign armed services' missions (from different geographical and economic contexts!),
and perhaps WHY we don't seem to see PN looking at vessels (whatever PN designation,
ultimately) that possess OPV design-sensibilities.

Profile-wise (as opposed to asset-wise)?
If I were to talk about 'PN looking back at the basics', OPV's might get lost in the noise.
I'd be arguing for shorebased OTHR arrays (here we go, blurring services' missions again);
better PN/NAG support facilities throughout KIG; additional AFD's; additional logistics ships
(with/for CONREP fluency in interoperability contexts, but also for the mission of supporting
and supplying aforementioned KIG facilities); and clearer understanding at all levels of the
difference between Link 16 (awhile back, proposed for PN??) as a LOS format... and Link 11
(and 22), especially for naval air in often non-LOS (OTH) opns, so that a better TADIL (TDL
for the younger shits) backbone can be built for our Navy and Coast Guard.

The list is endless, but rather than being depressing for sheer endlessness, the PN, NAG,
PMC, PCG, and yes, timawa --este, defph pala-- can view this massive gap as exciting.
Because it is exciting.

Massive improvements can be made to PN//PMC/PCG capability, operational readiness, and
asset-sustainability, by 'going back to basics', without any new warships acquired (albeit
new warships are clearly called for) and for less cost/time than acquiring a warship tends to
involve. Pero, as you recalled earlier, kung puro porma lang ang gusto, e, wala nang ibang
pag-uusapan kung hindi ang mga bagay na mapo-porma, neh? 'Sharp', 'pointy', 'shiny', etc.


Asset-wise? Well, yeah...
more of an OPV design philosophy might be applied when speccing new warships, but
only if the warship fits within the armed service's desired profile. If not, then we have
the sort of ad hoc acquisition of force-fit, 'puede na' platforms that ALSO afflicts EDA
shopping.
 

[mayk]

I'd be arguing for shorebased OTHR arrays (here we go, blurring services' missions again);

I would assume that with regards to this requirement, the PN and PCG have some minimal inter agency cooperation with the coast watch south and national coast watch systems. Unless its purely for real estate availabilty, why would the PN operate the national coast watch center from within PCG's compound even having former FOIC VADM Alano as head.

With air surveillance, I would assume that there is some interoperability roadmap between the upgraded CAAP CNS/ATM facility and the upcoming PAF Israeli made radars.

Now all we need is some strings and cans and duct tape to get the info from both systems to unified, AFP or Malacanan command centers to paint an overall picture of the Emperor's (in this case PH's) new clothes.

[horge]

Unless its purely for real estate availability

Boom.

Even having former FOIC VADM Alano as head.

To me, it attests to the depth of institutional/structural problems I perceive within PCG,
that even with the best reforming talent applied, said problems will likely remain.

Check that.
The perceived problems engulf PCG, but are ultimately rooted outside it, labas ng
column nga, which is why they are difficult to address, even with 'fire and Lysol'.

 

[LionFlyer]

There's also the matter of CYA  Safer to stick to what's already been proposed than to stick out one's neck out.

Nope.  I say with the certainty of a man working in my government (and a couple of different foreign governments)

Plans like these are targeted at the political leadership. The Navy doesn't need to drink the Kool-Aid. Memories are as long as the current Administration, and everyone wants something "new" so they could put their name to it. Being reminded that this was a plan from the previous Administrations is political suicide and a sure fire way to get it canned.

[Juramentado]

The Interoperability of assets aside, the division, operation and deployment of said assets by mission is what the real challenge is. If PCG is expected to deliver both SOLAS and 1st line detection/identification by virtue of being out there longer and more often than Navy assets, then they are woefully underequipped. From a COIN/LEO perspective, they'll get along just fine for now, but without additional enhancements to sensor and weapons fits, then all they can do is serve as a trip-wire function in higher intensity OOTW. Which brings us back to the classic white-gray dilemma. When to use one versus the other? It's the intermixed threat environment - especially in the WPS - militarized outposts fronted by Maritime Militia, then the Philippines is simply playing to the strengths of the nominal opponent. The lack of assets of either paint scheme is already a show-stopper to Presence Operations. So the answer might be to just start operating any asset as both SOLAS and Defense. IOW, don't distinguish. Teach the Navy to conduct LEO operations. Beef up the CG to have a more realistic defense capability beyond trip-wire. Have both forces train together more - so operating conditions, doctrine and TTP are exchanged, understood and practiced. The Philippines can't afford to build out even a tenth of the Fleet neccessary to confront symmetrically, so the only option is to stop looking at them as purely Navy or purely CG. They are Maritime Assets, period. Equip them as best possible and preferably identically, so that when another crisis point emerges, you don't care who is the closest, you just need a better and more effective response.

[mayk]

Which brings us back to the classic white-gray dilemma. When to use one versus the other? It's the intermixed threat environment - especially in the WPS - militarized outposts fronted by Maritime Militia, then the Philippines is simply playing to the strengths of the nominal opponent. The lack of assets of either paint scheme is already a show-stopper to Presence Operations. So the answer might be to just start operating any asset as both SOLAS and Defense. IOW, don't distinguish.

Which is what Manokski has been advocating for the longest time - integrate the PCG back to the PN. Increase fleet size, reduce redundancies and increase effectiveness all by just revising the law. (Of course there is a one time cost of lobbying the respective congressmen and senators).

This might be something worth looking at if and when Japan amends their constitution specifically their pacifist self defense stance.

I don't have facts at the moment but I believe JICA is one of the biggest sources of funding of the PCG. And this is why they are happy being a uniformed armed service of the DOTr. Pardon me but the attitude is "wala kami kahati sa pera ng JICA dito". A chance to earn lunch money from foreign funding, dealers and contractors other than those in the AFP.

[adroth]

I would assume that with regards to this requirement, the PN and PCG have some minimal inter agency cooperation with the coast watch south and national coast watch systems. Unless its purely for real estate availabilty, why would the PN operate the national coast watch center from within PCG's compound even having former FOIC VADM Alano as head.

With air surveillance, I would assume that there is some interoperability roadmap between the upgraded CAAP CNS/ATM facility and the upcoming PAF Israeli made radars.

Now all we need is some strings and cans and duct tape to get the info from both systems to unified, AFP or Malacanan command centers to paint an overall picture of the Emperor's (in this case PH's) new clothes.

The mix of assets in Panguan Island is interesting. Coast Watch station + PCG assets + PN assets.

http://defenseph.net/drp/index.php?topic=1591.msg4763#msg4763

Oh the lessons to be learned.

[horge]

Which brings us back to the classic white-gray dilemma. When to use one versus the other? It's the intermixed threat environment - especially in the WPS - militarized outposts fronted by Maritime Militia, then the Philippines is simply playing to the strengths of the nominal opponent. The lack of assets of either paint scheme is already a show-stopper to Presence Operations. So the answer might be to just start operating any asset as both SOLAS and Defense. IOW, don't distinguish.

Which is what Manokski has been advocating for the longest time - integrate the PCG back to the PN. Increase fleet size, reduce redundancies and increase effectiveness all by just revising the law. (Of course there is a one time cost of lobbying the respective congressmen and senators).

This might be something worth looking at if and when Japan amends their constitution specifically their pacifist self defense stance.

I don't have facts at the moment but I believe JICA is one of the biggest sources of funding of the PCG. And this is why they are happy being a uniformed armed service of the DOTr. Pardon me but the attitude is "wala kami kahati sa pera ng JICA dito". A chance to earn lunch money from foreign funding, dealers and contractors other than those in the AFP.

The minute you apply gray ships to an otherwise white situation, that is considered escalation.

Yes, shifting PCG to the DOTC column opened up a world of external aid, but more importantly
(wrt KIG and other Philippine territory being disputed by godless, foul-smelling, foreign dickbags),
it clearly civilianizes the PCG, and more clearly distances PCG from PN, on paper. "On paper" has
weight, up to the point where diplomacy yields the floor to firepower, and a lot of folks need to
decide, on which side of that point we are at a greater advantage/disadvantage.

A clearer separation between PCG and PN provides PH.gov greater scalability of its actions.
This does not at all rule out de facto joint-operations, because nga their AO's overlap.
 

[mayk]

The minute you apply gray ships to an otherwise white situation, that is considered escalation.

Can you enlighten me (us) on the gray vs white scenario? It surely is something that China uses to thier advantage. Is there some international law that dictates coast guard duties for civ agencies alone? After all we don't call them military anymore but a "uniformed armed service" of the DOTr. Is the differentiation similar to a constabulary vs police (insurgency vs crime; where the differentiation is not also clear to me, but thats for another topic)

It is quite clear that coast guard is for maritime safety which includes SOLAS, operation and maintenance of lighthouse, bouys and other navigation aides, anti-smuggling, maritime law enforcement, anti smuggling, anti poaching, anti drugs, port security and protection and border protection, maritime rescue.

Is it not possible to have a combined PN and PCG fleet and have a Coast Guard deputy on board for law enforcement? By deputy I mean is properly badged or "may chapa". The PCG can retain port duties and lighthouse maintenance. If you look at it the PN is using former USCG white hulls (GDP class and point class) for patrols. As it is, the PN ships is even lightly armed than USCG and Japan CG or China CG counterparts. The PCG was once part of the PN using gray hulls with the PCG stripe.

In Singapore coast guard duties are under the police, in Canada the coast guard is under the department of fisheries. Here in the PH we have both the maritime police and bureau of fisheries with their own maritime assets.

[mayk]

The Somali pirate problem for example where protection of merchant ships should be a coast guard problem right? But the combined task force protecting the sea lanes are all gray ships.

[adroth]

The Somali pirate problem for example where protection of merchant ships should be a coast guard problem right? But the combined task force protecting the sea lanes are all gray ships.

My cynical side views the combined task forces as opportunities for the various navies to conduct exercises and perfect their craft. For example, it's how the PLAN perfected their UNREP techniques. It's also a way for the various players in the region to justify maintenance of a local presence for all-manner of geopolitical concerns.

Somalia also doesn't really have the same threat matrix that the various players in the WPS / South China Sea / East Sea / Senkakus /  etc. that do. Note that Japan, South Korea, Vietnam are all keen to use their white ships to counter China . . . which thus far has also seen fit to reciprocate in the same manner. That being said, China has indeed been keen to create white ships that are now larger and even more capable some country's grey ships and is thus blurring the distinction.

[horge]

The minute you apply gray ships to an otherwise white situation, that is considered escalation.

Can you enlighten me (us) on the gray vs white scenario? It surely is something that China uses to thier advantage. Is there some international law that dictates coast guard duties for civ agencies alone?

AFAIK, there is no internationally-binding law on the matter, especially in a context involving China.
China nevertheless still cares (up to a point) about international image.

The Gulf of Aden being half a world away lends to deployment of a force BUILT for remote power projection:
grays, rather than whites. Whites are generally for protecting/policing home turf, neh?

And, on home turf?
What remains is that gray ships are generally intended for war, while whites are more for policing actions.
If you come all kitted-out (color-wise) for war, to a long-running situation hitherto tended by units in police
kit, you can be accused of escalation, with the other side now justified to openly deploy their grays as first
resort, and I don't think we want that.

There is no substitute for white ships, in sufficient numbers that PH can afford to operate.

How do we attain sufficient, affordable numbers?
a. utilizing both white and gray platforms for patrol and presence
b. utilizing economically-operated platforms (OPV design sensibilities) for gray and white fleets.

The key here is that while grays can detect, monitor and fly the flag, it is whites that confront.
The grays observe but keep some distance until/as whites arrive and prosecute action, with both gray and
white counting on the option of (land-based) fast air support.

It's not as if PN is giving up a lot, by choosing OPV's ove FFG's, when the FFG's being considered in so many
public fora don't/won't have the "G" in FFG. At the other end of the morass, OPV's have gotten pointier and
pointier, bigger and bigger, while still retaining the philosophy of endurance and seakeeping.

Either your profile is for global projection, which means UNREP logships and fast warships that RELY on said
UNREP... or your profile is for action closer to home, which means more autonomous endurance built into all
patrol assets, for maximum time on patrol (see OPV).