US - PH Mutual Defense Treaty

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Administrator's note: Related discussions

Philippines mulls clarifying if disputed territories part of defense treaty with US

Rebooting US-PH relations

US-PH Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA)

Joint US Military Assistance Group (JUSMAG)

How the treaty stacks up with others

The US-JP mutual defense treaty: First drafted in 1951. Re-written in 1960



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Often cited . . . even by folks who've never actually seen the text

C/o: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/phil001.asp

Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of the Philippines; August 30, 1951(1)

The Parties to this Treaty,

Reaffirming their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all Governments, and desiring to strengthen the fabric of peace in the Pacific Area,

Recalling with mutual pride the historic relationship which brought their two peoples together in a common bond of sympathy and mutual ideals to fight side-by-side against imperialist aggression during the last war,

Desiring to declare publicly and formally their sense of unity and their common determination to defend themselves against external armed attack, so that no potential aggressor could be under the illusion that either of them stands alone in the Pacific Area,

Desiring further to strengthen their present efforts for collective defense for the preservation of peace and security pending the development of a more comprehensive system of regional security in the Pacific Area,

Agreeing that nothing in this present instrument shall be considered or interpreted as in any way or sense altering or diminishing any existing agreements or understandings between the United States of America and the Republic of the Philippines,

Have agreed as follows

ARTICLE I

The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

ARTICLE II

In order more effectively to achieve the objective of this Treaty, the Parties separately and jointly by self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

ARTICLE III

The Parties, through their Foreign Ministers or their deputies, will consult together from time to time regarding the implementation of this Treaty and whenever in the opinion of either of them the territorial integrity, political independence or security of either of the Parties is threatened by external armed attack in the Pacific.

ARTICLE IV

Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific Area on either of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common dangers in accordance with its constitutional processes.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

ARTICLE V

For the purpose of Article IV, an armed attack on either of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the metropolitan territory of either of the Parties, or on the island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific or on its armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific.

ARTICLE VI

This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations or the responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

ARTICLE VII

This Treaty shall be ratified by the United States of America and the Republic of the Philippines in accordance with their respective constitutional processes and will come into force when instruments of ratification thereof have been exchanged by them at Manila.(2)

ARTICLE VIII

This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely. Either Party may terminate it one year after notice has been given to the other Party.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty.

DONE in duplicate at Washington this thirtieth day of August 1951.

(1) TIAS 2529, 3 UST 3947-3952. Ratification advised by the Senate, Mar. 20, 1952; ratified by the President, Apr. 15,1952; entered into force, Aug. 27. Back

(2) Instruments of ratification were exchanged Aug. 27, 1952.

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From: http://www.philippineembassy-usa.org/philippines-dc/embassy-dc/ph-us-bilateral-relations-dc/

Defense and security cooperation is coordinated through the framework of the Mutual Defense Board and the Security Engagement Board. The Mutual Defense Board provides continuing inter-governmental machinery for direct liaison and consultation on military matters of mutual concern to develop and to improve both countries’ common defense. The Security Engagement Board on the other hand, provides the framework and mechanism for continuing liaison and consultation on non-traditional threats to security such as terrorism, transnational crimes, maritime security, and natural and man-made disasters.

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Time to turn this into a thread index for US-PH relations

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Analysis on the MDT and its applicability

Evaluating the "3rd option": MDT



A strategy that relies on the MDT is a line of thinking with direct lineage to the ill-fated pre-World War II “War Plan Orange” that was supposed to have sent the US Pacific fleet across the Pacific to repulse an Imperial Japanese attack. As USAFEE forces retreated to Bataan as part of the plan discovered -- the hard way in April 9, 1942 -- the mere threat of retaliation did not prevent invasion, and the promise of reinforcement could be hampered by other more-pressing concerns. Unfortunately for the defenders of Bataan, the attack on Pearl Harbor had put the United States on the defensive and the security of the continental US had become paramount. They had become expendable.

In addition to keeping the Bataan experience in mind, when weighing the value of the MDT as shield, one must also be mindful of the wording of the treaty and the mechanics for enforcement.

Article 4 and 5 of the US-PH treaty states

ARTICLE IV

Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific Area on either of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common dangers in accordance with its constitutional processes.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

ARTICLE V

For the purpose of Article IV, an armed attack on either of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the metropolitan territory of either of the Parties, or on the island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific or on its armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific.

Arguably, faith in the MDT’s use as a shield against China emanates from these two provisions in the treaty. Particularly in the segments that indicate that an attack on the “armed forces, vessels or aircraft” of either party will trigger the MDT.

But how does this treaty ACTUALLY compare with other mutual defense agreements that the US has with its other allies and how is it enforced?

Treaty that created NATO
Treaty between US and Japan

While the JP-US and PH-US mutual defense treaties both lack the automated response provision of the NATO treaty, the US has categorically declared that they recognize Japan’s claims to the Senkakus. The same cannot be said for the KIG.

The discretionary nature of MDT activation, and the lack of overt commitment to defense of the KIG -- both of which represented the status quo long before the current administration came to office -- should give anyone pause when opting to rely on the MDT as a shield against Chinese aggression.

Treaty that created NATO



In the wake of 9-11 attack in New York City, the United States invoked Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, thus paving the way for NATO involvement in Afghanistan. It was the first ever actual use of the treaty and demonstrated its mechanics. This how the NATO treaty laid out its obligation.

Article 5
The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

As shown above, Article 5 of the NATO treaty has noteworthy differences with Article V of the US-PH MDT -- notably the use of the term “forthwith” in the stipulation for response to an attack. Unlike the treat with NATO, the MDT with the Philippines, instead, simply described the prescribed response as:

“declares that it would act to meet the common dangers in accordance with its constitutional processes”.

This difference in wording is arguably the result of the nature of the Soviet threat when the NATO treaty was drafted. Nevertheless, it means that as things stand, the US-PH MDT does not result in an automatic US response to a Chinese attack, as it requires observance of “constitutional processes”

In United States jurisprudence, this would require a declaration of war. An inherently lengthy process that can be expedited depending on the perceived importance of the declaration.

There is, however, an avenue for immediate military action in support of the MDT -- short of a declaration of war -- via executive action as permitted by the US War Powers Resolution of 1973. Under this act, The President of the United States (POTUS) can authorize the use of military forces for a duration of 60 days, with an option to extend by another 30 days, after which congressional authorization would be required for continued operation.

The MDT was written in 1951, at the height of the Cold War and when the Philippines was still host to numerous US military bases. The US needed unfettered access to these facilities, especially in the event of hostilities with the Soviet Union, so a treaty that tied the Philippines and the US to hip was a functional necessity. While post-bases relations with the US has improved in the wake of the 9-11 attacks, culminating in the drafting of the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) which pseudo-institutionalized US presence in the Philippines as part of the Global War on Terror, the resources the US appears willing to commit to the Philippines is defined by the confines of counter-terrorism needs. For matters outside this scope the US remains unclear.

In summary, triggering of the MDT is not automatic, and requires a political climate in Washington that is receptive to our point of view. This begs the question:

Would the US be willing to go to war over territory that it doesn’t officially consider to be ours?

Would any attempt, on our part, to enforce our claims that then results in China using deadly force on our forces constitute an act of defense . . . or could it be labelled as an offensive action and therefore declared as being out-of-scope for a “defense treaty”?

These are CRITICAL questions to ask because contrary to common perception, not all defense relationships are created equal.

Treaty between the US and Japan

Japan and the US have codified their security relationship with their own security treaty. The treaty currently in-effect was ratified in 1960, and replaced the original treaty drafted in 1951. The wording of Article 5 of the US-PH MDT is actually closer in substance to the corresponding article in the Japan-US treaty. Even more so than the NATO treaty.

However, while the form of the treaty has similarities, there is a fundamental difference in official pronouncements about how the US views the Kalayaan Island Group, and how it view’s Japan’s Senkaku islands, which are contest by both China and South Korea.

Compare the stark difference in the US' statements about Chinese aggression with Japan and with their verbage with the Philippines

On Japan on the Senkakus

Obama: Senkakus Covered Under US-Japan Security Treaty
U.S. President Barack Obama, for the first time, took a side on the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute, backing Japan.
By Ankit Panda
April 24, 2014
     
http://thediplomat.com/2014/04/obama-senkakus-covered-under-us-japan-security-treaty/
 
U.S. President Barack Obama opened his four-country Asia tour with a first stop in Tokyo.

. . .

In an interview ahead of his trip with Japan’s Yomiuri Shimbun, Obama said that the United States regards the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands as falling under the purview of the U.S.-Japan security treaty and that the United States would oppose any attempt to undermine Japan’s control of the islands. “The policy of the United States is clear—the Senkaku Islands are administered by Japan and therefore fall within the scope of Article 5 of the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. And we oppose any unilateral attempts to undermine Japan’s administration of these islands,” Obama stated in the Yomiuri Shimbun.


Mattis: US will defend Japanese islands claimed by China
Brad Lendon-Profile-Image
By Brad Lendon, CNN

Updated 2:58 AM ET, Sat February 4, 2017

https://www.cnn.com/2017/02/03/asia/us-defense-secretary-mattis-japan-visit/index.html

(CNN)US Defense Secretary James Mattis on Saturday reaffirmed Washington's commitment to defending Japan, including a group of disputed islands which have been claimed by China.

"I made clear that our long-standing policy on the Senkaku Islands stands -- the US will continue to recognize Japanese administration of the islands and as such Article 5 of the US-Japan Security Treaty applies," Mattis said in a press conference with Japanese Defense Minister Tomomi Inada.

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With the Philippines on the otherhand. . .

Aquino, Obama agree on Spratlys
By: TJ Burgonio / @TJBurgonioINQPhilippine Daily Inquirer / 01:22 AM November 19, 2011

http://globalnation.inquirer.net/18819/president-aquino-obama-agree-on-spratlys#ixzz4OYAUUOmY

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The two leaders squeezed in a 30-minute meeting before noon Friday at the Grand Hyatt Bali hotel on the sidelines of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean) annual summit, tackling maritime security, nuclear nonproliferation, disaster and humanitarian relief.

The Philippines is pushing to turn the disputed sea into a zone of peace, freedom, friendship and cooperation, which entails segregating disputed zones to allow free use and joint development of undisputed areas. This was  “noted” by other Asean countries.

Despite the cool response, Philippine officials saw a glimmer of hope, after some of its neighbors manifested the need to move forward with a Declaration of the Conduct of Parties on the South China Sea and draw up a “binding set of rules” on the West Philippine Sea.

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Paez said that while Obama made no commitment on the Manila proposal, Clinton clearly spelled out the US position  during her Manila visit early this week.

No categorical commitment from US to defend PH in sea row
By: Frances G. Mangosing - @inquirerdotnet INQUIRER.net / 04:09 PM June 02, 2018

SINGAPORE—US Defense Secretary James Mattis gave no categorical commitment on whether the Philippine-occupied features in the Spratly Islands in the West Philippine Sea (South China Sea) is covered by the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty.

While the JP-US and PH-US mutual defense treaties both lack the automated response provision of the NATO treaty, the US has categorically declared that they recognize Japan’s claims to the Senkakus. The same cannot be said for the KIG.

The discretionary nature of MDT activation, and the lack of overt commitment to defense of the KIG -- both of which represented the status quo long before the current administration came to office -- should give anyone pause when opting to rely on the MDT as a shield against Chinese aggression.

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Avoid unilateral acts, parties told amid alleged missile test
By Joyce Ann L. Rocamora  July 4, 2019, 8:49 am Share

https://www.pna.gov.ph/articles/1074038

MANILA -- United States Ambassador to Manila Sung Kim on Wednesday urged all parties involved in the South China Sea to refrain from "provocative" and "unilateral" actions that go against international practices amid China's reported missile testing in the disputed waters.

"We obviously urge all countries to refrain from provocative and unilateral actions that are inconsistent with international norms and practices," he said during a press conference in Makati City.

"We have stated our position very clearly for quite some time now and I believe that our friends in the Philippines agree that countries, including China, should refrain from such actions," he added.

Asked if the US is concerned about the reported militarization in the area, he answered in the affirmative.

"I think we have long been concerned and it's not just the US but I think countries in the region have been concerned about aggressive unilateral actions in the disputed areas, including militarization by China. It's clear that countries should behave according to international norms and practices and laws," he stressed.

"In fact, China itself has indicated that it would stop militarization but obviously that has not happened," he said.
A Reuters report dated July 3 quoted an anonymous source saying China has recently tested multiple anti-ship ballistic missiles in the South China Sea, an act described by the Pentagon as "disturbing".

In a recent briefing, however, the Chinese Foreign Ministry deferred to its defense ministry when asked to confirm the veracity of the report.

Any armed attack triggers MDT

Meanwhile, Kim reiterated that any armed attack against the Philippine forces, aircraft, and public vessels could trigger Washington's obligation under the Mutual Defense Treaty.

"I think Secretary (Michael) Pompeo was quite clear when he made that statement in the Philippines and in fact, he conveyed that commitment directly to President (Rodrigo) Duterte in his meeting with the President," he said.

China, Taiwan and several Southeast Asian countries including the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, and Vietnam, have overlapping claims in the South China Sea.

Last week, Duterte dared the US, as well as Great Britain and France, to help Manila assert its rights in the hotly-contested waters after being frustrated by criticism that he has failed to confront Beijing over its aggression in the area.

When asked to comment, Kim only reiterated Washington's position in the region.

"As you know, we diplomats are very cautious about answering hypothetical questions and I think it's important to remember that it has been our consistent position, and I think it has been the consistent position of all countries including claimants, that the dispute should be resolved in a manner (that's) consistent of international norms, practices," he said. (PNA)

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https://www.facebook.com/dfaphl/photos/a.1204846236336875/1380026998818797/?type=3&theater

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https://www.facebook.com/groups/rpdefense/permalink/2505828652836300/?comment_id=2510005359085296





Response to the exchange above

Art C Tan and Mark Mark Dave Canieso Duterte has NOTHING to do with the US' cautious approach towards support for the PH position in the WPS. This attitude actually predated the current administration. Remember, the US actually brokered the pull back from Panatag Shoal in 2012. The PH complied, China didn't -- which is why we are where we are today.

The US, c/o of JUSMAG, has a front-row seat to DND-AFP HISTORICAL incompetence going back to the days before Marcos. From piss poor planning, to inability to think ahead when it comes to budgeting. AFP planners actually lament that JUSMAG is so accustomed to a DND-AFP that is, at best deferential, and at worst mendicant. Heck, the DND-AFP isn't above asking JUSMAG to help with the per diem of AFP officers that are sent to the US for schooling. Imagine what that does for our image in their eyes. On top of all of that . . . the PH rejected the US-PH bases agreement in 1991 WITHOUT a proper plan for replacing the funds that would be lost as a result. What kind of a "partner" was the Philippines really? We are a LIABILITY, plain and simple.

If the Philippines REALLY wants a viable MDT with the US, it needs to show-the-the-US-the-money. We need to be viewed as a partner that can actually think for itself . . . be willing to step away from the US if our interests called for it . . . and spend its own money. THAT is how the US views Japan: a partner it needs to keep happy, because it is in their MUTUAL INTEREST to be allies. Japan isn't looking for dole outs.

Ergo, as counter-intuitive as it may seem to folks who view the US-PH relationship as a black-and-white issue, a perception of a "pivot away from the US" actually HELPS US-PH relations because it resets the discussion, sets the ground work for a relationship between partners, rather one between a former colonizer and a predictable beggar that they colonizer "already figured out".