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Messages - horge

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31
But isn't it possible PAF had actually already gone and evaluated and realized FA-50PH needs a 'kuya' after all?  ;D

With PAF, anything is possible.
As adroth points out, PAF seems to have reevaluated a lead-in fighter-trainer (modified for light attack)
into a "light MRF" now. I actually think that sort of cognitive dissonance goes back to the very beginning
of the SAA-LIFT program. CGPAF Rabena stopped just short of formalizing it.

Name pa lang, no? "Surface Attack Aircraft / Lead-in Fighter-Trainer"
Almost ALL new-gen AJT's have an easy conversion for ground attack precisely because part of the AJT
syllabus includes weps (drill and/or live). E, kaso the impetus for eventual MRF acquisition was problems
out in the WPS, so en vez de "ground attack", ginawang "surface attack" to accommodate maritime.

The point to getting LIFT was to prepare pilots, groundcrew, PAF command, the OOP and above all, the
budget-authoring legislature for the PAIN of increased funding, maturity and competence demanded by
the effective operation+sustainment of MRF. If the "inreased funding" part is truly out of our reach, then
so be it --but the original point of the program is still what it was.

The SAA (Surface Attack Aircraft, lol) part was to address the need for an INTERIM/stopgap combat jet,
when we were down to just a handful of BJT's (the S-211's), so we'd have SOMETHING to fight with,
never mind how feeble the SAA, until proper MRF were online.


... Zulu ...

You're still going on about those? 

Kitted-out Mi-17 daw with a pitch for Mi-28A/N, 'di ba?  ::)





<<Peace Carvin in Reverse>>
That was a thread on timawa that IMO focused on the need for PAF to absorb correct sustainment skills
and culture by osmosis, through direct contact with and exposure to US Armed Forces practices wrt to
sustaining aircraft.

Because of "muh sovereignty" issues with basing US forces here (IIRC, EDCA was still in limbo then) I
suggested the halfway-option of incentivizing ATAC(!) to maintain a permanent presence here, to ease
ATAC's logistics in supporting regional shitfests like Balikatan, Cobra Gold, etc...
all in the hope that PAF might learn a thing or two, by osmosis nga.

However, I admitted it would likely all go sour anyway, because of 'mighty dragon vs. local serpent.'
Learning is so much harder when there's a lot of unlearning to do at the same time.

32
But when even the PAF started calling its plane a "Light MRF", I just gave up.

Pussy.  ;D

33
I think both SAAB's own estimates and claims from the recent Slovakian purchase re: op costs for Gripen and F-16 should be taken with a grain of salt.
EVERYTHING has to be taken with a grain of salt.
Vendors ALWAYS tell lies, big and small, uphill and downhill.

Who's to say that having a swarm of F/A-50s with some form of BVR and backed up by airborne radar platforms isn't the right way to go?
Myself, for one.  ;D
See below.

:P Launch and land from a distance instead of trying to tangle with J-11s.  ;D
But which BVRAAMs would those be?
You can only shake wut ya momma gave ya...
Same applies to PGM's for moving sand or spearing fish, and besides, you might have to
rethink what OPFOR air would likely be trying to do, and what PAF would be trying to do,
if actual shooting ever broke out, and the conditions under which shooting would begin.
Try to rethink who would be the one forced to enter the other's AD sphere.

As for the lack of "daylight" between a putative 39 C/D and a 50, I offer a different argument for the
acquisition of the 39 as a weapons platform... why not use the 39s as a dedicated maritime strike or
anti-shipping platform? They have the necessary AAR/IFR capability the current crop of 50s lack. They
also bring the requisite sensor and payload capacity expected of a dedicated maritime strike platform.
They also bring a built-in capability in the RBS-15 missiles instead of having a missile system integrated
on whatever platform we own/buy...

I prefer to think of it this way... the FA50s would act as our Mirages(lol), while the JAS-39s act as our
pissed-off, Exocet-slinging Super Etendards(lolol).
Okay, but you're not changing the level of pain, so much as redefining its purpose, and I
suspect many can point out that there are acquisition/sustainment-cheaper alternatives
as AAR-kitted AShM platforms: the runts of the litter perhaps being those mothballed AM
AMX pitched at PH awhile back (theoretically cleared, or at least successfully-evaluated
for Marte ER and Exocet). There are certainly more capable options that still cost so much
less (lifecycle) than 39, because most of them are EDA.... but I'm rambling now.

With your leave, m...

[soapbox]
We were (correct me if I'm wrong) talking about maritime strike, or worse, interdiction?
In like tone as my caution to Mr.S...  just whose AD bubble is this all taking place in?
What possible, effective role for a 'swarm' of AAR-illiterate, heater-only FA-50PH, then?
That far out to sea (or rather, that far into OPFOR AD), it's all on the AAR-fluent PGM-slinger.
Does ^that not then prescribe true, fully-capable MRF?
It still wouldn't be enough, no? Given the domestic EWR picture, even Viper is a limp dick.

We'd need true MRF operating within a true AD-defeat system, which we can't afford.
It's something 99% of the nations upon God's green earth can't afford.
That's why, in that context again, we'd sorely need our MDT ally's superpower support.

PAF assets will have crucial roles to play, interoperating with the US in an MDT situation.
PAF assets have crucial roles to play, precursive or preventive to an MDT situation.
PAF assets include platforms other than combat jets, and its the "other than" category that
will play the BULK of those crucial roles, keeping our Republic safe from her enemies.
[/soapbox]

Would that lack of 'daylight' between 39C/D and FA-50 get even more pronounced should KIA get a go-ahead from LM to build and sell a single-seat version of the FA-50 with AAR capability and maybe even CFT?  FA-50's in that configuration forming the bulk of our tactical fighter squadrons and acting as a 'node' in a fully functioning IADS might not be so bad.
One can dream.
Until there actually IS such an FA-50 iteration in LRIP man lang and available to PH,
dreaming is all ^that is, 'di ba?

I'd rather focus on what FA-50PH can actually do, before gauging what a putative 'kuya'
(elder brother) MRF should be able to do. What did Marawi teach us about FA-50PH's CAS
and Strike limitations, and in a zero-AD environment no less? What do FA-50PH's real world
(PAF) and theoretical loadouts, its combat radius thereby, and above all, the state of and
prognoses for PH EWR, tell us about FA-50PH's limitations in *gasp* OCA or (okay, I'll play
along with the most common armchair-gaming) DCA or kahit man lang maritime strike?

I've been deliberately talking about a 'sweet spot', and about 'pain', for a reason.
Tell me if a comfort zone is compatible with military readiness.

I do hope PAF gets AH-1Zs because, based on their reaction to the American F-16 'overture', that might be the only "Viper" they're ever going to fly. ;D
You're brutal.  I like you. :o  ;D
I doubt there will be Zulus though.

34
No argument the F-16 Block 70 is far superior to the JAS39CD. 

Even 50/52 outmatches 39C/D, and therein may be one of the real tricks to keeping the 39's
on-paper sustainment costs low: actual combat capability can be correlated to TOW. 39C/D's
claimed DCPFH alone is astonishingly low, but is not quite so low for E/F (aka NG), yes?

As Saab made the 39 more and more capable, to match rival platforms (and more importantly,
potential-operators' NEEDS), the 39's weight increased generationally, and inevitably bloated
its DCPFH. If the 39 were to ever truly match Viper for capability, I suspect that the daylight
between the two platforms' opcosts would vanish, or that Viper might even come out costing
less, PFH.

The real question is whether there's enough capability daylight between FA-50PH and 39, to
justify the colossal cost of another combat jet logistical tail. IOW, if it's going to really hurt in
the nuts, no matter which MRF is selected, why not get the MRF that more substantially out-
performs the FA-50PH?

Flip it around: if Viper seems too much capability and cost (lol), and Gripen seems not enough
improvement over FA-50PH for its cost, then is it not an indication that FA-50PH actually hits
closest to a sweet-spot intersection of capability we actually need and cost we can afford

:o  ;)  ;D  :o  ;)  ;D



Yes, I'm trolling against my own preferences... but I'm trolling for a NEEDS-based discussion.





35
Sir, what can you say about India having mixed russian (Kilo & Akula) and western (Scorpene & Type 209) submarines in its fleet? It seems they don't have inter-operability problems with these subs and their surface fleet.

I'm not sure I understand where you're coming from.
India doesn't have an MDT with anyone, hence no obligation to maintain MDT-level interoperability with anyone.

If I understand it correctly and please correct me if I am wrong, inter-operability is more on how both navies/armies/services communicates and identify each other in the battlefield or in exercises. MDT aside...it seems to me that inter-operability (communicating and identifying) is not a problem in the case of Indian Navy having mixed russian and western submarines and surface fleet...


That is why I prefaced my "simplest of examples" with first "setting aside the bugbear of two logistical tails".

You seem to be drawing parallels between different orders of magnitude: operation and interoperation.
Sure, you can make a mixed-bag of assets work on your lonesome, but the inefficiencies (logistical and
otherwise) will be magnified into real difficulties, once you have to interoperate with an MDT ally.

This is what a lot of interested parties have to understand: while there is a virtue to diversity, against the
danger of a single logistical source being suppressed, the cost of diversity is inefficiency which in turn leads
to an increased cost of defense AND a reduced effective strength, even before we consider interoperability
with MDT allies.

The danger of a single logistical source being choked off is IMO a phantom anyway, in our case:
Who/what is really to blame for any PH difficulty in acquiring certain US arms technologies?

The Philippines is an MDT ally and MNNA of the United States. It is frankly fantastic, the opportunities we
have wrt to acquiring and sustaining US defense materiel.

The United States however tries to be a responsible arms vendor, because indiscriminate distribution of
arms and arms technology can lead to unwanted instability/atrocities of the civil, regional and even global
sort, the latter two of which the United States is almost invariably called upon to set to right, at the cost
of United States blood.

Other vendors treat anyone with money as welcome, which can be as bad as selling crack to children.
Do we have the money?* Do we behave like children?
If no and then yes, we'll have difficulties even with the "other vendors", much moreso the United States.

It is ENTIRELY within our power to have proper sustainment culture, because we've done it before.
It is ENTIRELY within our ability to actually pay for modern arms, because we've done it before.
It is PLAUSIBLY within our ability to act as a mature, dependable ally... because, despite a national
average IQ of 86 (you gotta love statistics) we hopefully elect leaders who are better than average.

Have what it takes to evidence all of ^that, naturally and not just for show, and increased ease of
access to US arms technology will be only the most minor of benefits, because then the Philippines
wouldn't be a so-called Third World nation anymore, would it? We'd be building, more than buying,
arms and arms technology.


No country knows the Philippines better than the US. JUSMAG is so intertwined with AFP operations, in some ways it can be said that the US knows the AFP better than it does itself.

If we were to simply work to gain the US trust by simply playing along, how long do you think it would take to change the status quo?

If JUSMAG knows AFP better than AFP knows itself, then it can be trusted --better than AFP-- to recognize
a true sea-change in AFP culture/maturity and PH.gov culture/maturity, and then JUSMAG will do what it's
tasked to do.

As I pray is evident from what I posted above, I am pushing for some real change NOT merely in order to
"gain US trust" as you put it, but because that real change is IMO necessary to secure our country's own
freedom and prosperity, regardless of US interests.






*I mean real money, not a mere budget line-item in search of a commercial credit facility that can support
progress billings, thus reassuring bidders/vendors, when PH.gov does its usual delayed-payments dance.

36
Sir, what can you say about India having mixed russian (Kilo & Akula) and western (Scorpene & Type 209) submarines in its fleet? It seems they don't have inter-operability problems with these subs and their surface fleet.

I'm not sure I understand where you're coming from.
India doesn't have an MDT with anyone, hence no obligation to maintain MDT-level interoperability with anyone.

37
This is, what? The sixth time we've been 'offered' F-16?  :o  ;D

There was Marcos' export-version thumb down.

Yes, the Marcos-era offer was AFAIK first.

There was also the offer from Reagan communicated  by visiting Secy of State George Schultz
in 1986, of an alleged two squadrons of unspecified Falcons, but which went south when, IIRC
Cory Aquino snubbed a visiting Secy of Defense Caspar Weinberger, in turn due to some other
diplomatic fracas.

Then there were the embargoed Peace Gate FMS Falcons, which weren't delivered to Pakistan
due its nuclear ambitions, and were boneyarded in 1995, just a year after manufacture. These
were offered to Indonesia, which then backed out, and to the Philippines 1995-1997. Initial
offer was for 11 birds, but changed over time when Taiwan turned down their allotment of 17
of the same birds, for being less advanced (Block 15 OCU) than the birds Taiwan was already
operating. In any case, the Philippines dithered because (given the Asian Economic Miracle)
some PH legislators rejected second-hands and demanded BRAND-NEW aircraft, kasi nga daw
"because we deserve better". Lol, the Asian Economic Crisis hit in 1997.

The cry for BRAND-NEW aircraft nevertheless produced an exploratory proposal for such, and
however short-lived, the "brand new" birds would AFAICT have still been the same boneyarded
Falcons, albeit with SLEP and upgrades to 50/52 standard, but, cue the Asian Economic Crisis.

Then there was that PH-US "2+2" meeting which produced what can only have been an interim
solution: a couple of (lol) boneyard Falcons for us to LEARN how to operate and sustain the
sort... but again, pride and harrumhping  ruled the day.

And then there's this latest offer.
IMO, EDA Falcons --or even new-order Vipers-- are technically ALWAYS available. MNNA tayo.
They are technically ALWAYS on offer... but we still have to evidence a serious intent to
acquire, operate and sustain in a responsible manner. Balik an naman tayo sa 'maturity'.

That last thing aside, shit's ALWAYS on offer. All that really changes is the offer to finance.
JMHO, YMMV, TANSTAAFL, etc.


Duterte to

accept US offers for AFP if done ‘in good faith’


Quote
President Duterte is still not keen on accepting the offer made by the United States for the
modernization of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) unless he is sure that the act is done in good faith.
Duterte made the statement after he revealed that US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross,
and Secretary of Defense James Mattis expressed wanting to meet him.

The President then argued that if ever he decides to buy any of the items, there is no assurance that they will really
arrive to the country, or if they really are new ones and not just refurbished.

“I would lime to remind America–all of them. How sure na makuha ko ‘yung binili ko (that I will get what I bought)?”
Duterte asked.

While I may disagree with his habitual style of expression...
President Duterte is right (as a buyer's rep) to be concerned about delivery. There is  enough
basis on the ground for an embargo to deny us the birds, just like what happened to Pakistan.

However, Pakistan was a real buyer with real money, and had every right to voice concerns.
The Philippines seems more in the mode of demanding a triple discount on factory-overruns,
as well as a loan to pay the triple-discounted price, and still expecting full warranties and
VIP customer service, lol

38
This is, what? The sixth time we've been 'offered' F-16?  :o  ;D
If it's anything like the last four offers, I fear it will all come to the same end result, and not
because of the quality of the materiel in play. If we want something, we have to pay to
acquire and sustain. If we don't want to pay (even soft loans require repayment), nothing
will come of it.

Attack rotary-wing has been on the table for DECADES, and have AFAICT revolved around
Cobras. State Department would have fewer qualms signing off on the sale of a platform
with very limited regional-projection, but same salsa again: if we want something, we have
to pay to acquire and sustain. If we don't want to pay (even soft loans require repayment),
nothing will come of it.

(Re)publicizing what the PH can avail of (if it does its part as a credible buyer-operator, not
least of which is putting up the cash to acquire, and the infrastructure/logistics to sustain)
is a smart way to address the "sabong" (for the non-Tagalog speakers, 'cockfight') style of
bargaining employed by PH: it'll play on "the historic bond between PH and US", and give
PH.gov something to show for its bargaining... but may not actually be putting anything
really new on the table.


I hope there IS something new on the table (IOW, more generous financing terms, which
IMO is what Pres. Duterte has and/or should have been playing for all along), but you will
have to color me jaded, m...

because practical poverty and prideful sense of entitlement are the colors of the season
for the majority of those who post online as interested Filipinos, as is likely to reflect
something in the larger offline population as well, and politics is playing to the crowd.

Cheers,
h.



 

39
Because it is less work than replying to separate emails with a similar point, I'll bite again.

No, Russia and the US carp at each other all the time, and especially so, after the US, under
Obama, trampled Ukraine's sovereignty in the name of regime-change. The recent reaction
of the Russian Embassy is just that. IMO we aren't being drawn into some new bigger thing:
we are merely the newest venue / the latest opportunity for more RU-US verbal cattiness.

i think this is a stupid retort but ill give it a go. Since total requirement for ph i think is gonna be more than 2, if we assure US that the next one/s will be west oriented, will that be amenable to US conditions of interop?

Will getting russian subs a way also of learning our enemy since acoustic signatures i think are not shared even allies? maybe im wrong. Im just readying myself to the possibility of PN owning russkie subs and making a fool of myself that im rationalizing the purchase.

Setting aside the bugbear of having two separate support tails for only three(?) subs...

I think it's wrong to view this simply as a matter of two rival vendors trying to make a sale,
with a diplomatic option to please both by splitting our business. There are extremely real
inter-operational and operational issues involved in PH deploying, say ...Kilos, and these
issues start cropping up before we even consider network-centricity.

To use the simplest of examples: rival claimants (potential OPFOR) are already deploying
the same vessel type, with the same sonar signature, potentially to the WPS. Why make
it harder for USN, via fleet assets and/or whatever form Fish Hook (SOSUS) has taken, to
tell if a suspected contact is a friendly.ph or a hostile.xx? Is PN going to provide the US
with real-time position/heading on all PN subs? Haha. Can PN even generate such data
(via ELF, lolol, or diurnal surfacing for open shoulder-tapping, etc.) for PN's own use?

Or, leave the U.S. out of it: assuming PN has effective ASW in place, how does PN ASW tell
which of two similar contacts is friendly, when there's only one PN boat underwater?

Even if we commit to NOT get Russian subs... until we have a good ASW game going, it is
quite risky to deploy any subs, for the same lack of confidence in telling friend from foe.
At worst it could lead to us attacking our own. More likely, it could paralyze what should
be very decisive ASW action against an submerged interloper, because of doubt that the
the contact could be one of our own.

I earlier raised the issue of maturity, and ^this is more about common sensibility.

...and ultimately, despite my (over)reacting, hilaw na hilaw pa ito:
PN submarine acquisition is mostly vapor at this point.





40
More than interoperability, you got to note that THIS is really a dangerous toy for the PH, which might put that MDT (hence the US) in a very dangerous play :-)

That inclines more towards the other point I revisited, that of trusting an angsty emo teenager
with a loaded gun. But huwag na natin pag-uaspan ang 'maturity' behind the decision to pull (or
not to pull) the trigger. That's a separate problem kasi, from deciding which gun to buy, or more
critically, deciding WHETHER to buy a gun or not.

Why not instead talk about basic 'maturity' with respect to operation and sustainment?
Why don't we look at how the PN has been faring wrt operating and sustaining its ex-WHEC's,
and guess if PN is ready for the trickier business of operating and sustaining submarines?

In something as basic as DC pa lang, based on what's been promoted graphically on this forum
lang, mukhang sablay na... e how much more critical is DC in a submarine? What about basic
maintenance cycles, have PN learned? Or is it still "Fix it when it breaks" / "Use it 'til it breaks"?



As part of ongoing maintenance of any Russian sub in PN service, the Russians will -- at some point -- have to be involved. If US systems are installed on the sub, especially sensitive communications equipment related to network-centric warfare, could the US really trust the Russians not to use that opportunity to study that equipment when they are onboard ship? Note that some of this equipment is so sensitive, the US actually even prohibits photographs of this gear.

BUT, isn't this a two-edged sword for Russia?  if they can view the equipment through maintenance, what about US getting access to the whole sub? this is still - "if" US systems are installed but what if they won't installed? and they (US) can still access the sub? di ba lugi si Russia?


Yes, but that's a lesser issue that risks skating over the core truth, buried in what adroth posted,
and which really tends to prescribe AGAINST "buying Russian subs".

Assuming PN is even ready to operate and sustain submarines in peace and in war...
Assuming PH political/militical infrastructure is even ready to wield submarines in peace and in war...

One shouldn't try to just "buy submarines" or "buy fighter jets", as if piecemeal, stand-alone tools.
One should always try to buy into combat systems, and for better or worse (well no, it actually is
for the better) we are wedded to the West. Since early days pa on timawa, we have been talking
all about network-centricity as the way of modern warfighting, so why would we now want to risk
network incompatibilities by buying piecemeal, from very different defense contexts?

Again, the US isn't imposing NATO-style requirements on us, to maintain a NATO-level strength.
The US isn't even asking us to maintain a regionally-respectable strength (although that's an
obligation of any sovereign state). The US is asking and helping the Philippines to be ready to
interoperate with US forces, in case the PH-US MDT is ever triggered: again, so that should the
US step in, the US and PH don't step on each other.


In any case, this US vs. Russian (overblown) brouhaha is just the scum on top of the swamp.
The submarine acquisition by itself is what triggers me, kasi...

my personal worry is that defense acquisition in the Philippines seems ad hoc and immature.
Even when systems-incompatibility isn't the danger, it sometimes seems very... fanboi. It can
seem oriented  towards the shiny-pointy stuff, but not the critical infrastructure that ALLOWS
the shiny-pointy stuff to work properly.

Bibili ng short-legged LCA, pero bakit parang hindi man lang tumingin ng (A)EWR? ng AAR/IFR?
Bibili ng LPD, pero asan na ang ibang critical LOTS components? Ang shorebased log backend?
Bibili kaagad ng submarine, kahit wala man lang working ASW culture/infrastructure muna?
Bibili ng discount-frigate, pero ....     ahh, fuck all this shit with a cactus, I'm done here.











41
I stand corrected on Major Non-NATO ally, what I really meant was being a US ally with MDT.

Then you've still a ways to go.
See my addendum posted above, quoted below for your convenience.

To the peanut gallery, the PH-US MDT doesn't cover KIG, period.
If I have to explain why, then I might as well tout the value of a high school education.
Wikipedia --despite its many errors-- is fucking free, and I urge the clueless to use it, before
they claim the US has broken faith under the PH-US MDT. That aside, on principle alone...

All this pathetic whingeing about why the US didn't step in when we were bullied, but zero f'in
consideration at all for whether the Philippines has developed ANY capability to step in when
the US gets bullied.  Shit, the US isn't even asking for that. It's just asking for interoperability
sustainment, so that when it does step in, it doesn't step on us.

If I seem unduly harsh, trust me, it's aimed as much at myself as at you.

Despite my post count, I'm not some newcomer to these issues.
I would be posting here a lot more frequently if:
a) I believed that what I had to post could be safely (and thus usefully) shared.
b) I believed that I knew enough --for sure-- to be posting an opinion.

42
Philippines being a Major Non-NATO Ally did not matter to China, if it did, they would have not encroached into our territory and built those artificial islands. And it did not matter to US as well, if it did, they would have prevented China long time ago...so why would we even bother thinking about the MDT when it is actually useless to us.


Uhm, I recommend you find out what MNNA status actually is, before you post.

MNNA status isn't about mutual defense: it is simply a prerequisite designation
that allows acquisitional access to U.S. defense materiel and some other
defense-development assistance normally restricted to NATO allies only.

It's like a membership card to get you in the door of the club, but you still have
to pay for what's on the menu... and even within the club there are VIP rooms
requiring further clearance.

As for the MDT being "useless"...if you feel that way, then argue to dissolve it.
Arguing to simply ignore it devalues ANYTHING we might sign with others, down
the road, because by your reckoning, treaties don't actually bind.

Abandoning the bond of ratified treaties IS an example of playing in the gutter,
and if you want to play that way, abandoning the rules, you'd better have the
muscle to back it up. China believes it has that muscle, which goes a long way
towards explaining why it (mis)behaves the way it does.


At the end of the day, I have to wonder if the controversy over a Russian option is ultimately meant to make the selection of a South Korean submarine more palatable . . . after the whole FAP brouhaha.

Quite possibly, but not "ultimately".

Setting aside the unlikelihood that the US Assistant Secy had wandered off the reservation...
"ultimately", we're being reminded that we're an MDT ally with interoperability responsibilities.
We are being reminded we have MNNA clearance to access materiel containing components
governed by hard US licenses --notwithstanding OTHER clearances that are still necessary to
obtain-- and MDT/MNNA access to US defense-developmental assistance to help us afford the
acquisition and effective operation of said materiel.

The more we behave like an ally, the more we will be cherished as an ally.
Japan , South Korea, and even Thailand have benefited far more from alliance with the US than
we have because they BEHAVE as allies. They make effort toward credible military capability
that is useful to the US, and generally behave like adults even when they disagree with the US.

The Philippines?
Every country has its self-interest, but to reduce even our public pronouncements to only the
language of self-interest is anathema to treaties, which live on shared interest.

We've all had our discussions in the past about trusting an angsty teenager with a loaded gun.
The Philippines needs to grow the fuck up.

To the peanut gallery, the PH-US MDT doesn't cover KIG, period.
If I have to explain why, then I might as well tout the value of a high school education.
Wikipedia --despite its many errors-- is fucking free, and I urge the clueless to use it, before
they claim the US has broken faith under the PH-US MDT. That aside, on principle alone...

All this pathetic whingeing about why the US didn't step in when we were bullied, but zero f'in
consideration at all for whether the Philippines has developed ANY capability to step in when
the US gets bullied.  Shit, the US isn't even asking for that. It's just asking for interoperability
sustainment, so that when it does step in, it doesn't step on us.


43
Ever considered the possibility that entertainment of an offer is simply to set the bar for all other potential bidders?

Others can play ^that game, lol.
One can run the same shtik to set the bar AGAINST all other potential bidders.

You can't forgive this government its lack of discretion, in the name of getting the Philippines a better deal,
and then criticize an ally for doing the EXACT SAME THING. You want to play the game in the gutter, you'd
better learn quick that others OWN the gutter and can play it better than you ever can.

44
WHY shouldn't the US advise us when our stated plans may negatively impact PH-US interoperability, and thus our ability to fulfill our MDT obligations?


because real partners/allies discuss, and can disagree, without throwing tantrums like children.

Why advise this way instead of directly via the ambassador and/or the US-PH MDT board?

Why air such disagreements in public instead of directly at the people who are responsible for actual decisions?


I am informed that said advise WAS given discreetly and repeatedly (submarine acquisition has been an open topic
for quite awhile now). For whatever reason the US mouthed off publicly, albeit far more gently than our President
has in response: it'd be awfully rich, coming from this Philippine government, if it were to criticize the US for a lack
of discretion in putting forward its opinions, advise, and critiques.

I know you've been pushing it for some time, but "getting a better deal" is a virtue up only to a point, generically.
In the real world of interoperability, where establishing trust in order to share something as sensitive as, say (to
keep it somewhat relevant to submarine ops) sonar signatures and profiles, however, there comes a point when
you have to pick a brand, and stick to it: because few of the vendors sell on the open market.

The Philippine situation is even more tightly defined: the Philippines already "picked a brand" in 1951.
MNNA status counts for something, but an MNNA still has to pay, and it behooves an MNNA to act like one.







45
Duterte challenged the US to state in public why they are opposing the acquisition despite the fact that other Southeast Asian countries like Indonesia and Malaysia, both US allies, have submarine fleets.

The answer to his question is succinct and explicit and already given, ffs.
Buying Russian entails a PH-US opportunity cost, which affects PH-US interoperability,
which entails an PH-US opportunity cost, which affects PH-US interoperability...
recursively, ad infinitum.

Neither Indonesia nor Malaysia are MDT allies of the US, and for all the bitching and whining
on this and other PH defense discussion boards about our ally the US (as almost always boils
down to a shameful, mendicant, 'gibsmedat' mentality), "mutual defense" means we have an
ACTUAL obligation to maintain interoperability. It's a two way street.

Christ help us, but can we have some fucking pride, or at least a sense of responsibility?
Decide. Are we an ally or a mere dependent?  A partner or a whore for the highest bidder?

If US is willing to pay the other half of the price of western made submarines being offered to us then by all means we should buy those submarines, but if they are just bitching without any alternative then they should better shut their mouth and leave us alone.


WHY should the US pay for half? WHY should the US have to offer alternatives?

WHY shouldn't the US advise us when our stated plans may negatively impact PH-US interoperability,
and thus our ability to fulfill our MDT obligations? We certainly retain sovereign right to proceed with
buying Russian if we so choose, but the US is simply informing us that there will be a negative effect
on interoperability, AND on defense development opportunities BECAUSE of interoperability issues...

because real partners/allies discuss, and can disagree, without throwing tantrums like children.








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