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Messages - horge

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General Discussion / Re: C-130 #5125 crashed in Jolo
« on: July 12, 2021, 03:50:44 PM »
For instance, could there be a flaw in the training regime resulting in ill-prepared pilots?  Or could this somehow be the result of fatigue where too few qualified pilots end up flying too many hours?  Should the PAF re-examine its priorities from focusing too much on getting new assets to re-calibrating how they prepare their personnel to operate these assets safely?

I don't know how PAF really is, wrt to their drivers keeping quals up, but...
the reliable ability to execute, say... an assault landing requires periodic exercise of
the skill, or it perishes; and as the landing was technically in a hot (well, marginally-warm)
AO, then a choice toward an assault landing could be argued as doubly-justified. Shortness
of the runway is arguably another factor in favor.

It's times like this when I really miss the old forum

Timawa was what we wanted it to be, for awhile...
then it wasn't what some wanted it to be...
and then it simply wasn't.

...because the blade angle is almost near, if not, at feather. To me, it means either of two things a) the throttle was at what is called “beta” or ground setting. High blade angle for high throttle setting? Or b) the negative torque system (nts – works when the prop is putting torque to the engine) was activated, initiating a feather...

Even a layman could argue that impact kinetics might have thrown the throttle (operator's
attached hands notwithstanding) into the wrong quadrant.

"Flight deck confusion" is a real thing, but with drivers killed, and both FDR and CVR already
in-hand, perhaps that might be a bit too much color preempting. *shrug*

General Discussion / Re: C-130 #5125 crashed in Jolo
« on: July 12, 2021, 02:13:38 PM »
I’m not a Pilot but this can be one of the causes (snipped from another group).

“Jolo runway is inclined with the end significantly higher than the threshold. One way takeoff and landing. I think the gradient is 2%. Gives pilot a ‘too low’ optical sensation.”

The emerging suspicion appears to be that the pilot was attempting an assault landing, but at excessive
groundspeed (as in, excessive even for an assault landing); that the aircraft still seemed to have hit the
assault 'sweet-spot' on the runway, meaning the pilot wasn't thrown off by the runway slope, however
the excessive speed necessitated an abort, and then control was lost. I don't know how/if TOLD comps
are filed by PAF drivers. The recovery of the FDR will yield some, but possibly not all, of the answers we
all want.

The post-touchdown 'zigzagging' reported by eyewitnesses, if reliably accurate, raises suspicion of failure
in application of reverse thrust (blade angle), but whether this stems from equipment failure or operator
error may demand forensics on far more than just the FDR.

But I wasn’t there so I don’t know what happened and I don’t want to speculate.

It's certainly been a tragic couple of months for Philippine military aviation, sir.
My condolences to the families of those who perished.

I'm posting to this thread because the other one has a borderline-cancerous title.

I think it's way overdue for the vendor to flog the Chinook.

Awhile back I was posting to a thread that was comparing the Romeo 'hawk to the Hip as potential acquisitions,
and I pointed out that it was apples to oranges: that a better matchup was Hip vs. Chinook, and that even with
the payload-class advantage, Hip was a truly retarded choice compared to the 'hawk.

Heavy-lift rotary wing is sorely needed in a country with our geography, whether we're talking about HADR or
frontier infrastructure... never mind .mil administrative/tactical movements of men and materiel.

PH is fortunate that Boeing needs to shore up its bottom line, which in turn relaxes the normal objections that
the US State Department (+ others) would have over transfers of .mil hardware to us --I'm sure everyone here
has had ample exposure to the sort of horseshit that the DSCA regularly plasters on ("...the proposed sale of
xxxxxxxxx and support will not alter the basic military balance in the region"
ad absurdum) whenever the current
US administration DOESN'T want to transfer .mil goods/services to a supposed MNNA like us.

That said, it costs next to nothing for Boeing to use the press like this, to stoke Boeing shareholders.
It would, however, cost a fortune for PH acquire Chinook.

Depending on scale of purchase: about US$40M each with sides & a soda, but CPFH is a reasonable US$6,900-ish
when loaned/extended (US 2018) as a billable to friendlies in need, and DCPFH is only about US$4,600 (RAF 2018)
--the latter is cost independent of cross-system expenses, such as will bloat the taxpayer-billable operating costs
of the aircraft for a HIGHLY cross-networked operator like the US Army.

CH-47 DCPFH can be cheaper than MH-60x, partly for lugging fewer systems, and the 'hawk (as I'd pointed out in
the prior thread) actually comes out cheaper, and more importantly, massively more reliable than Hip. Its potential
for cross-country electoral campaigning is undeniable, and might help push it through both Houses of Congress (if
OOP even wants to go through Congress --OOP annual discretionary is more than enough) far more easily than
the other bird Boeing is pimping in that article...

I really, really don't like Apache for the Philippines, though.
I think I might dislike it even more than Hip, and not for any lack of performance/capability.

for a quick dip into the nuances of arriving at CPFH:

There is a big difference between a vendor-initiated pitch, and a formal response to a properly ABC-backed RFP.
The spirit of that difference translates even into a context of direct-nego.

Blurring the difference potentially poisons the well, and lies close to my chief complaint vs. that PNA news(?) article.

I don't think this is a matter of us being taken more 'seriously' just because we've successfully
run out big-ticket buy-cycles prior. Either our money is there at the appointed hour or it isn't, for
the Swedes at least. With the U.S., things are even goosier: the U.S. has seriously offered PH
Lawn Darts before ---indeed long before any big ticket notches in our belt: the double dozen
Falcon offer of 1987 in particular, such as I will cite again later.

I'm not worried about foreign attitudes, but rather, local issues. I'm looking at political horizons.

Foreign observers can freely speak on their own domestic contexts, but here, in the Philippines,
money and political will are far more tenuous considerations. My points of reference go a decent
ways back: I personally remember when the last of the MAP Freedom Fighters was delivered,

My worry is based on this:
It's almost always well past noon whenever MRF (particularly F-16) aspirations get zombied up.
The only time post-60's these were floated up early enough in a term to be credible was when it
was the U.S. that broached it (just like the MAP F-5) to Corazon Aquino's administration, via then
Secy of State Shultz in '87, but then the U.S. Treasury Department's finest just *HAD* to deeply
offend someone's brother, to the point of nixing any/all F-16 talk.

If talk starts late, the option for the US to just string us along, until a more amenable-and-pliant
administration is in place (one they can dictate inferior terms to), is just too attractive for them
to pass up.

Rodrigo Duterte is stepping down post summer 2022, and we're past halfway through his term.
I've seen Presidents with far less erratic policy-making fail to stay the course in MRF acquisition
when started so late: COUNTING on an impending end of term to absolve them of the cost. I've
also seen succeeding administrations back-burner the defense acquisition projects of far less
antagonizing predecessors, out of sheer spite.

....but this is really about the vexing quality of the (non-)news item itself.
No, I leave SecDef Delfin Lorenzana blameless: he was asked a question, which he answered,
whereafter the PNA decided to fill in the blanks with hot garbage:

F-16V? Really?
PNA will posit 70/72 which are nearly 200M (with sides and sauce) each, new-build, even when
in a larger-scale deal like ROC's 66 new birds + 144 upgrades from Block 20 ... cock-pitted (in the
"sabong" sense) against a Swedish bird that costs less than half? Worse still if it's 39C/D rather
than new 39E/F. Even on an AMARG-zombie-upgrade-to-quasi-70 route, it's a ridiculous mismatch
on cost terms, flyaway and especially lifecycle... and even more ridiculous a mismatch on  basis
of performance spec quals/disquals... so why assume 70/72?

Puñeta, e sa "General Dynamics" F-16V pa lang, this article was just underripe compost.
The same kind of MRF-related sewer-gas we've all had to deal with, again and again and again...

AFP Modernization & Defense Acquisitions / Re: AGM-65 @ FA-50
« on: December 20, 2019, 03:43:32 AM »
Those are still drill: in layman's terms, training/dummy missiles.  :)


Thanks, that's what I'd been hearing as well.

I was hoping that at some point, there was a department-level procurement (or acceptance of foreign EDA).

It would be astonishing if a service had actually drafted specs for a public bid, followed by an actual contract,
delivery, and then general issue to servicemen.

Kindly let this float in Gen/Disc for a bit (for higher visibility) before punting it to Equipment/Gear.  :)

Have any of the Philippine armed services ever issued (or been issued) a spec/standard wristwatch for servicemen?
What/when, if so?



General Discussion / Re: Black Hawks for the PAF?
« on: December 24, 2018, 10:11:51 AM »
Wouldn't time with the existing S-70 count as training time?

With the basic platform, yes.
With the newer systems on-board the contract 'hawks, no.
This is especially true wrt CBM, which directly affects opcost.

I still find it hard to believe that Russian rotary air (Mi-17) was a serious contender.

I'd hope anyone who actually reads the MDT should emerge understanding that implementation
is pendent upon US political process, and I mean 'political' in the crudest sense.

The commonality between Japan, Korea, PH and yes, even NATO countries, is that their national
security is pendent upon US political process, and deteriorating relations between US and NATO
are the root and yet also the fruit of the EU's effort to form an EU army.

From an optics standpoint, it does look clumsy. But if it works . . . optics don't matter.

I think my point is that optics are extremely political; and politics dominates MDT implementation,
much moreso any attempt at MDT augmentation.

Otherwise, we're retreading ground you and I have walked before.
Can PH realistically approach Japan, SoKor or NATO in terms of economic and military weight,
anytime soon (since time is a luxury we do not have), for the US to think us indispensable?

More attainably... can PH realistically approach Japan or SoKor in terms of optically-appreciable
POLITICAL commitment to MDT with the US, or have we been optically undermining the same?

If we cannot make ourselves indispensable as treaty allies quickly, then we may have to bind
ourselves to something that IS indispensable to US interests, and something geographically
natural for us to bind to, and that is freedom of navigation in WPS.

Militarily, we have done next to nothing to do so, or even indicate that we care to do so.

I guess most of what I'm saying is this:

The PH-US MDT doesn't include KIG today, and couldn't have included them when the MDT was inked
If KIG were included, it would be impossible for the US to assume a neutral stance (as it clearly, presently does)
wrt to our ongoing territorial dispute with CN. That's just basic, common sense, with no need for clarification. Any
PH attempt to 'clarify' is thence actually an attempt to EXPAND the coverage of the MDT.

Again, the MDT was set down in 1951. Tomas Cloma claimed some of the Spratly Islands in 1956 for himself, and
named them the "Free Territory of Freedomland". He waived his rights to the same in 1974, in favor of PH which
formally incorporated the territory as Kalayaan in 1978. There is a mechanism in the MDT for 'clarifying' or perhaps
modifying the treaty's scope, but in all the decades since 1951, the US has remained firm against any attempt to
"move the goalposts" of the MDT.

This is a pretty fucking bad time to try to 'move the goalposts' in the PH US MDT
Even if it's just a trial balloon being flown in the press, it's very ham-handed... and actually comical, for PH to be
seeking assurances of support from the US against CN, after so many months of PH shamelessly flirting with CN
AND scorning the US. Moving from feelers to actual finagling, Jim Mattis was the last voice of reason against any
Libertarian excesses (via prior Trump campaign promises) in the current US administration. Sure, neither those
Kurds nor the other allied parties in Syria and Afghanistan have, or are operating under, an MDT with the US, but
the sudden decision to honor a campaign promise "to bring troops home" means leaving those allies stranded
and vulnerable ---and Trump doesn't care: it's now more important to bring, and keep, the troops home.

ANY newfound reticence 'to commit US forces abroad' doesn't bode well for a PH attempt to BROADEN A BASIS
'to commit US forces abroad', on behalf of Philippine interests. Even if Trump now backtracks to original pick
Tom Cotton for new Def Secy, Cotton is no Chaos. There will be no one in Trump's Cabinet with anywhere near
the necessary cred, to be able to stall any further isolationist drift. Even without this drift, the US administration
is in borderline crisis mode right now, due to several factors separate from Mattis' exit, and will not have the
time or inclination to bend an ear to PH requests for increased US exposure, so again: fucking bad timing.

The way to ensure (increasingly self-interested) US involvement is by focusing on US interests, not Philippine ones.
It is clearly in the US interest to counter Chinese expansion, and preserve Freedom of Navigation, in the WPS.
That's actually a much wider and much more sensitive tripwire than the MDT, and it behooves the Philippines to do
its part and develop capabilities as a useful partner in preserving Freedom of Navigation. PH needs FON as much
as any other trading nation that sends (out/for) goods through the WPS. There are just too many fanbois with a
hard-on for MRF and FFG, but no concern about the lack of PH logistical muscle to support said assets, nor indeed
to support our allies who have and actually know how to employ MRF and FFG against CN capabilities. There's
no lack of pie-in-the-sky BVRAAM tingles, and not enough concern about AEW support, let alone broad-spectrum
AD-defeat realities.

tl;dr: it is potentially a very dangerous time for PH, made potentially worse by a foreign policy of this government
that boils down to clumsily trying to play the US against CN, and an AFP Modernization policy which is too insular.

We've had numerous US ambassadors, US State Dept Secys, and US Presidents delicately, and also not
so delicately, denying a US obligation to mutually-defend KIG.

Longstanding US policy of neutrality wrt the PH-CN dispute, instead focusing on freedom of navigation,
should be enough answer from a technical standpoint:

If the US considered KIG part of Philippine territory, then neutrality would not be an option.
Just look at the date when the MDT was inked versus when Cloma claimed KIG, or (more to the point)
when PH formally incorporated KIG as Philippine territory... and you can see that KIG is literally not what
the US signed up for.

US assurances --however hazy-- of support in crunch time, should also be enough answer wrt to what
the US would do outside of the MDT, if KIG were attacked. Trying to bind the US response in KIG to the
PH-US MDT may politically (and practically) limit what the US can do to back PH up, in case of conflict.

Trying to pin the US down on this issue right now, and so publicly, is questionable.

Even if Pres. Duterte had not thrown Pres. Trump's invite to the US, back in Trump's face...
Even if Duterte hadn't made a very public display of siding with China while scorning the US...
Even if Jim Mattis hadn't resigned as Def Secy, over Trump's no-foreign-entanglements policy drift...

...why pre-empt asking, in this public manner?
Article III of the US-PH MDT is very clear on the mode of asking such a question, and it's Teddy Locsin
who should be asking it, not Delfin Lorenzana, and definitely not by wayof pre-emptive press release.

Besides, Lorenzana just met with US State Dept Secy Mike Pompeo last September.
Did someone forget to ask something they felt important, or are they forgetting the answer?

General Discussion / Re: What would happen if China collapses?
« on: December 15, 2018, 07:38:11 AM »
Decline is not collapse.

China declining would be a good thing for us, if we can "industrialize in order to capitalize".
I think I'd throw a party at end of every fiscal year that China's economy shrinks >0.5%
More than 1%, I throw in free hookers (trannies, if that's what some party guests want).

As for mainland Uighur expansion.... we-ellll...
Metro Manila's own population could be 54% Muslim in twenty years.
That just means more party-guest bachelors who could marry up to four tranny hookers each.


Military History / Re: Return of Balangiga Bells
« on: December 14, 2018, 07:54:35 AM »
the turnover rites of bells to Eastern Samar officials.

I hope they ultimately mean Eastern Samar Church officials, or is facilitating a second theft of the bells.

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